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THE PARADOX OF PERSONALITY: 
MENTAL ILLNESS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, AND THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr 
by Deirdre M. Smith* 
INTRODUCI'ION 
Both medicine and the law devote considerable concern to draw­
ing lines, that is, to classifying and making distinctions. In medicine, 
such line-drawing occurs when a person is designated healthy or ill, 
normal or disordered, appropriate for treatment or not. In the law, 
such line-drawing determines who bears legal responsibility in situa­
tions such as the commission of a crime, the termination of employ­
ment; or failure of a business deal. The line-drawing process, 
especially regarding social classifications, is always potentially prob­
lematic, and sometimes acutely so. This Article will consider one such 
acutely problematic process that involves both QJ.edical and legal 
practitioners. 
Within their own realms, both medicine and the law attempt to 
distinguish between "mental illness" and "disfavored personality," 
that is, between being a person with a mental illness and one with 
certain personality traits and behaviors disfavored by those persons 
one encounters. However, both psychiatrists and courts have been 
unsuccessful. in finding bright lines to follow in making that distinc­
tion. On the contrary, the line-drawing process is exceedingly thorny 
in both areas. In.medicine, the pathologizing of personality is one of 
the mqst controversial and unsettled aspects of psychiatric labeling. 
In law, the implications of such labeling become simultaneously signif­
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icant and difficult under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 
While society may pathologize noxious personalities, thus making 
them "disabilities," it is loath to extend disability-based legal protec­
tions to persons with such pe.rsonalities. Rather, some commentators 
regard the extension of ADA legal protections to persons with such 
personalities as improperly removing or excusing their responsibility 
for their own behavior, while wrongly assigning legal responsibility to 
the persons who must interact with them. Thus, the invocation of 
"personality" in cases brought by persons alleging discrimination on 
the basis of "mental illness" causes a collision between societal and 
psychiatric attitudes towards certain psychological conditions and the 
law. 
A review of personality in psychiatric and legal settings reveals 
that the dichotomy between illness and personality is not based upon 
empirical science; therefore, it is wholly susceptible to social construc­
tion and implementation. Courts rarely acknowledge this fact. None­
theless, placing an individual's condition on one side of the line or the 
other can have significant consequences in courts' allocation of 
responsibility in employment discrimination claims. 
Specifically, an excessively broad view of "mental illness" may 
overly limit the bases upon which the· law permits employers to "dis­
criminate" based on personality traits. By contrast, a restrictive view 
may insulate from review discrimination based upon the societal atti­
tudes against mental illness that the ADA was designed to eradicate. 
Courts, by and large, have taken a more restrictive view of the mean­
ing of "mental illness" and have employed approaches that ensure 
that personality issues are eliminated from ADA analyses. This 
approach has swept broadly, limiting the ADA's power to remedy 
. past discrimination and to compel society to examin~ the place of peo­
ple with mental illness in the workplace. 
·Part I of this Artiele provides an overview of psychiatry's debate 
regarding the status of "personality" as it relates to "mental disor­
ders" and "mental illness" and discusses the debate's social and legal 
significance outside the ADA context. Parts II and III examine impli­
cations of the personality/mental illness dichotomy in the context of 
employment discrimination claims under the ADA. Part II first pro­
vides an overview of the ADA's framework for evaluating employ­
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (2000 ed. 
and Supp. II). 
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ment discrimination claims and then examines courts' struggle with 
personality's role in the ADA employment discrimination analysis in 
the context of cases involving adverse employment actions taken 
against employees seen as having noxious personalities (some of 
whom were specifically diagnosed with personality disorders). Part 
III examines the discussion in agency commentary and in the case law 
regarding the legality of using "personality" tests in the employment 
context. Part IV considers some implications of courts' conceptualiza­
tion of personality's role in employment discrimination claims, ancl 
suggests a more reasoned approach. Finally, Part V concludes that, 
unless and until courts reverse the current trend of applying the ADA 
to systematically eliminate protection for those subject to discrimina­
tion based upon allegedly repugnant personalities, the ADA will 
never serve as an effective tool for advancing the civil rights of people 
with mental illness. 
I. 	 THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
The elusive notion of "personality" occupies an unsettled place in 
the context of mental health diagnosis and treatment. While psychia­
trists and other professionals in the field have long regarded personal­
ity as having some role in the evaluation and management of 
psychiatric disorders, they have never reached a consensus on what 
that role is or should be. To this day, psychiatrists cannot agree on 
whether and to what extent a person whose most prominent symptom 
is that of an inimical personality is actually mentally "ill." This contro­
versy and its consequences are best demonstrated by tracing the 
evolution of "personality disorders" within psychiatry's diagnostic 
nomenclature and the resulting social and legal significance attached 
to such diagnoses. 
A. Personality Pathology and Disorders 
The diagnosis, classification and pathologization of human behav­
ior, thoughts, and beliefs have had a complicated and often troubling . 
history. Psychiatry and its notions of "mental illness" have been far 
from static. At times, society has found certain conduct so objectiona­
ble that society regards it as the manifestation of an "illness" or "sick­
ness." Modem society now tolerates, or even condones, some of these 
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behaviors.2 Alternatively, the act of ascribing pathology to conduct 
may be regarded as progressive because it recognizes that an illness 
"causes" certain conduct and lifts blame from the victim ofthe illness. 
The recognition of alcoholism as an illness is one example of such 
responsibility-shifting from the individual to the disease. In examin­
ing psychiatric labeling's history, many scholars have questioned 
whether the age of pathologizing disfavored behavior has passed or 
whether it accounts for much, or all, of psychiatric diagnoses today? 
As one psychiatrist recently observed: "People have not changed bio­
logically in the past 100 years"; what has changed is "the culture, our 
understanding of mental illness."4 "Since mental illness is a widely 
accepted rationale for [the twin dangers of] relieving people of 
responsibility and depriving them of liberty," one commentator has 
reasoned, "the psychiatric is unavoidably political. "5 The political 
dimensions of mental illness diagnoses must be considered in any psy­
chiatric-labeling analysis, and the history of the "personality disorder" 
exemplifies the role of sociopolitical attitudes in such labeling. 
Although personality traits have long served as one basis for psy­
chiatric classification,6 psychiatrists did not attempt to specifically 
2 EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY oF PsYCHIATRY FROM THE ERA OF AsYLUM TO.THE AoE 
oF PROZAC 303 (1997) ("For two centuries, culture has been the swamp for psychiatry ...."). 
Until1974, homosexuality was considered a mental illness by the American Psychiatric Associa­
tion. /d. at 303-04. The diagnosis of "hysteria" was historically applied to behaviors by women 
that were considered abnormal or improper. Jd. at 292 (noting that nineteenth century neurolo­
gists pathologized so much of women's behavior as to "make hysteria virtually coterminous· with 
femininity"). Many of the behaviors that we now regard as a disorder's symptoms, such ·as 
obsessive-compulsive disorder or anorexia, were once ascribed religious significance (performed 
by those especially pious or close to God}. Benedict Carey, Who's Mentally Ill? Deciding is 
Often All in the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4, at 16. Other modern symptoms were 
previously regarde.d as evidence of sinful tendencies or even satanic possession. !d. (referripg to 
observations made by Dr. Nancy Tomes, SUNY Stony Brook). 
3 See infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text. 
4 Carey, supra note 2 (quoting Laurence Kirmayer, M.D., McGill University). 
5 Jacob Sullum, Thomas Szasz Takes on His Critics: Is mental illness an insane idea?, 
REASONONLINE, May 2005, http://www.reason.com/0505/cr.js.thomas.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 
2007) (reviewing SzAsZ UNDER FIRE: THE PsYcHIATRIC ABOLITIONIST TAKES ON His CRITICS 
(Jeffrey A. Schaler ed., 2004)). 
6 Within these debates, the proper place for notions of "personality" is unresolved. Person­
ality classification is at least as old as Hippocrates, who theorized that all disease resulted from 
of an imbalance of the bodily humors-yellow bile, black bile, blood and phlegm-and identi­
fied four "temperaments": choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic. THEODORE MIL· 
LON ET AL., PERSONALITY DISORDERS IN MODERN LIFE 19 (2d ed. 2004). Since that time, 
several neurobiological and psychodynamic/psychoanalytic theories have developed to explain 
personality origin and development. /d. at 36. See ANNIE PAUL, THE CuLT oF PERSONALITY: 
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identify personality disorders as distinct from psychoses, neuroses and 
mood disorders until the middle of the twentieth century. In his His­
tory of Psychiatry, Edward Shorter suggests that the development of 
"personality disorders" classification partly arose during World War 
II, when "[m]inor personality problems unremarkable in civilian life 
became of great importance in the military setting. "7 Still, psychiatry 
lacked a well-developed system to classify and understand behavior 
that was "essentially normal," but problematic to some degree in a 
person's interpersonal relations.8 Further, as psychiatrists began to 
treat an increasing number of individuals outside of the institutional 
context,9 they had a larger client population of patients with less 
severe forms of mental illness.10 
The United States Government developed the "official catego­
ries" of persons for census purposes, which then became the first clas­
sification systems used by psychiatrists to describe persons with 
mental illness.11 In 1917, the psychiatric field published its own diag­
nostic system, the Statistical Manual for the Use of the Institutions for 
the InsaneY In 1952, the first edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association's (" APA") Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders ("DSM")13 replaced the previous diagnostic system and is 
now widely regarded as the standard of psychiatric diagnosis in the 
United States. · 
Each successive volume of the DSM and its revisions provide a 
history of the evolution of psychiatric classification for the second half 
How PERSONALITY TESTS ARE LEADING Us TO MisEDUCATE OuR CHILDREN, MISMANAGE 
OuR COMPANIES, AND MISUNDERSTAND OuRSELVES 200 (2004) (describing current research 
using "brain-scan" devices to identify biological roots of personality). 
7 SHORTER, supra note 2, at 298. 
B /d. at 291. The term "nosology" is often used to describe psychiatry's classification sys­
tems. /d. at 298. 
9 Indeed, the treatment (and costs thereof) was another factor that influenced the DSM's 
development. As Bowker and Star note: "The DSM ... is the lingua franca of the medical 
insurance companies." GEOFFREY C. BowKER & SusAN LEIOH STAR, SoRTING THINGs OUT: 
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 47 (1999). 
10 HERB KuTcHINS & STUART KIRK, MAKING Us CRAZY 40 (2003). 
11 /d. at 38. For example, at the time of the 1880 census, there were seven classifications of 
mental disease: mania, melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and epilepsy. 
/d. at 38-39. 
12 /d. at 39; SHORTER, supra note 2, at 298. 
13 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTiC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (1952). 
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of the twentieth century. 14 The second edition of the DSM ("DSM­
11") was published in 1968, largely to keep the manual aligned with 
the World Health Organization's International Classification of Dis­
eases.15 The number of disorders increased significantly with the 
release in 1980 of the third edition of the DSM ("DSM-III"), which 
represented a significant rewriting of the manual. A revised version 
of the DSM-III was published in 1987 ("DSM-III-R"), followed by the 
fourth edition of the DSM ("DSM-IV") in 1994. Most recently, the 
APA published the "text revision" of the fourth edition ("DSM-IV­
TR"),16 in 2000Y 
The category currently referred to as "personality disorders" in 
the DSM-N-TR experienced significant changes in the different edi­
tions of the DSM. The DSM-II devoted only a few pages to the clus­
ter of "personality disorders," which were "characterized by deeply 
ingrained maladaptive patterns of behavior that are ... life-long pat­
terns, often recognizable by the time of adolescence or earlier."18 The 
listed disorders included paranoid personality, cyclothymic personal­
ity, schizoid personality, explosive personality, hysterical personality, 
14 Kutchins also demonstrates that the recent editions of the manual largely reflect the 
outcomes of political battles over diagnoses, rather than objective medical research. KUTCHINS 
& KIRK, supra note 10, at 16-20. See also SHORTER, supra note 2, at 303 ("Politics represented a 
fmal pothole on the high road of science for the DSM-Ill drafters. Even though they were 
struggling to cling to 'the data,' they were buffeted by ideological lobbies and forced to make a 
series of concessions. All this negotiating left the impression that what the drafts had created 
was as much a political document as a scientific one."). 
15 KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 40. 
16 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. text rev. 2000) ("DSM-IV-TR"). 
17 Changes in the field of psychiatry itself can be tracked in the successive editions of the 
DSM. For example, there has been a marked shift away from psychoanalytic concepts in.DSM's 
pages, including the complete removal from DSM-IV of the term "neurosis." SHORTER, supra 
note 2, at 305. The revisions also reflected social and political trends in society. See KUTCHINS 
& KIRK, supra note 10, at 55-99 (providing detailed history of the events leading up to the 
removal of the homosexuality diagnosis from DSM-111); SHORTER, supra note 2, at 301, 303-04 
(commenting that the inclusion of anorexia nervosa in DSM-111 seemed "highly ethnocentric," 
since it seems unlikely that anorexia nervosa would be found in other parts of the world and "if 
the DSM-III had been drafted in India, it would have included a big section on demonic posses­
sion"); KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 100-25 (describing the successful campaign waged 
by veterans of the Vietnam War for the inclusion of a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disor­
der in DSM-1!1). See also BowKER & STAR, supra note 9, at 47 ("A 'reverse engineering' of the 
DSM ... reveals the multitude of local political and social struggles and compromises that go 
into a 'universal' classification."). 
tB KUTCHJNS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 130. 
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antisocial personality, and inadequate personality.19 In the editions 
since the DSM-II, the APA has added Narcissistic Personality Disor­
der, Dependent Personality Disorder, Masochistic Personality Disor­
der, Self-Defeating Personality Disorder, Passive-Aggressive 
Personality Disorder, and Borderline20 Personality Disorder.21 Other 
"personality disorders" have been dropped or reclassified in various 
editions of the DSM. 22 
19 ld. at 131. 
20 "Borderline Personality Disorder" has been subject to much attention and debate since 
its inclusion in DSM-III. See DANA BECKER, THROUGH THE LooKING GLAss: WOMEN AND 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER, 49-86 (1991) (describing the origins of the term "bor­
derline personality" and current controversies surrounding the concept's application). The term 
"borderline" does not indicate that the personality is on "the border" between two different 
conditions, although it appears that the condition evolved from what was previously thought to 
be "latent" or "borderline" schizophrenia. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 177-78. Pres­
ently the term indicates an "unstable" personality. The condition has generated considerable 
controversy and is reputed to be the diagnosis most used when a therapist strongly dislikes his or 
her patient, or assigned after-the-fact when a patient and therapist have a sexual relationship. 
/d. at 199 ("'Borderline is a wastebasket diagnosis; the diagnosis is given to patients who ther­
apists don't like, or who are troublesome or are hard to diagnose and treat.' ... Borderline is a 
code word for trouble for the therapist.") (quoting personal communication with anonymous 
therapist); see also Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 271, 279 
(2000) ("The personality disorders, especially borderline personality disorder, often reflect little 
more than the diagnoser's intense dislike of the person diagnosed. Some clinicians have even 
suggested doing away with the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder because its connota­
tions are so pejorative.") (citing Association of Therapeutic Communities, The Need for an NHS 
Policy on Developing the Role of Therapeutic Communities in the Treatment of "Personality Dis­
order," Position Statement 3 (Sept. 1999)). See also KUTCH INS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 176-99 
{providing a detailed recounting of the development of the diagnosis). 
21 KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 131. 
22 For example, "Sadistic Personality Disorder" was included with the release of DSM-III­
R but dropped from the DSM-IV. !d. "Inadequate Personality Disorder" appeared in DSM-II 
but is not in DSM-IV-TR. Jd. Kutchins documents the fiercely-waged battle over inclusion of a 
proposed "Masochistic Personality Disorder" in the DSM-III-R. ld. at 126-75. The debate's 
resulting compromise was the inclusion of a reference to "Self-Defeating Personality Disorder" 
in the appendix,. but expressly disclaiming its status as an "official diagnosis in the classification." 
ld. at 165-67. There is no reference to the disorder in the DSM-IV-TR. ld. at 167. Similarly, 
the term "Multiple Personality Disorder," a diagnosis included in DSM-III and once part of 
common parlance, served as a favorite topic of books, movies and television while it was "epi­
demic" in the 1980s, SHORTER, supra note 2, at 291, but is now entirely gone from the DSM. It 
has been replaced with several types of Dissociative Disorders, which appear as their own cate­
gory in the DSM-IV-TR, characterized by "disruption in the usually integrated functions of con­
sciousness, memory, identity, or perception." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 16, at 519-33. The· 
diagnoses and associated concepts of the condition (such as whether one can actually have "mul­
tiple personalities") remain controversial and unsettled. See, e.g., JoAN AcocELLA, CREATINO 
HYSTERIA: WOMEN AND MuLTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER (1999). It is unclear W~ether, 
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The DSM-IV-TR describes a Personality Disorder as "an endur­
ing pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly 
from the expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and 
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable 
over time, and leads to distress or impairment."23 Classification of 
personality disorders is rather nuanced. The DSM-IV-TR groups the 
ten different specific disorders24 into three "clusters" based upon 
"descriptive similarities," meaning· their outward appearances to 
others (not necessarily diagnosticians): 
Cluster A includes the Paranoid,25 Schizoid,26 and Schizotypal27 Per­
sonality Disorders. Individuals with these disorders often appear odd 
or eccentric. 
Cluster B includes the Antisocial,28 Borderline,29 Histrionic,30 and 
Narcissistic31 Personality Disorders. Individuals with these disord~rs 
often appear dramatic, emotional, or erratic. 
Cluster C includes the Avoidant,32 Dependent,33 and Obsessive-Com­
pulsive34 Personality Disorders .. Individuals with these disorders often 
appear anxious or fearful. 35 
The DSM~IV-TR editors caution: "Personality Disorders must be dis­
tinguished from personality traits that do not reach the threshold for a 
Personality Disorder."36 Rather, the diagnosis of "disorder" is 
despite its name, multiple personality disorder has ever been considered a personality disorder 
per se. 
23 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 16, at 685. 
24 The DSM-IV-TR editors note that there is a diagnosis of "Personality Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified," for individuals who meet the "general criteria" for personality disorders 
and have either traits fram several of the enumerated personality disorders or a personality 
disorder. that is not included in the DSM's classification (the provided example is "Passive­
Aggressive Personality Disorder"). /d. 
25 See infra at 150 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

26 See infra at 150 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria .. 

27 See infra at 151 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

28 See infra at 152 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

29 See infra at 152 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

30 See infra at 153 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

31 See infra at 153 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

32 See infra at 154 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

33 See infra at 155 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

34 See infra at 155 for listing of specific diagnostic criteria. 

35 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 16, at 685-86. 

36 /d. at 689 (emphasis in original). 
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reserved for those traits that are "inflexible, maladaptive, and persist­
ing and cause significant functional impairment or subjective 
distress. "37 
However, the notion of personality trait-"a long-standing pat­
tern of behavior expressed across time and in many different situa­
tions"38-is not easily separable from that of a personality disorder. 
Theodore Millon, one of the leading psychologists to develop the 
modern DSM classifications of personality disorders, characterizes 
such disorders as conditions in which several personality traits typi­
cally occur together.39 Scholars have noted that this differentiation 
between the "manifest symptomatic picture" of a disorder and the 
"personologic system that undergirds It" dates back to Socrates, Plato 
and earlier.40 Thus, traits are not synonymous with disorders, but the 
disorders are characterized by specific traits. 
This illness/personality dichotomy is also reflected in the DSM's 
separation of Personality Disorders from other mental disorders in its 
"multiaxial" approach to psychiatric diagnoses.41 "Traditional" 
mental disorders, referred to as "clinical syndromes" (including mood, 
I,42thought, and anxiety disorders) are listed under Axis while 
"abnormalities of temperament" (personality disorders). are placed 
under Axis II. Axis II disorders are considered "long-standing and 
pervasive" and resistant to brief treatment.43 The segregation of the· 
personality disorders under the multiaxial approach "ensured that the 
more enduring and often more prosaic styles of personality function­
37 /d. 
38 MILLON, PERSONALITY DISORDERS, supra note 6, at 3. 
39 For example, those persons identified as having Antisocial Personality Disorder 
rAntisocials") are often "manipulative, reckless, aggressive, irrespo11sible, exploitative and 
lacking in empathy and remorse." MILLON, PERSONALITY DISORDERS, supra note 6, at 3. For 
diagnosis, a person need only demonstrate a bare majority of the traits listed for the particular 
disorder. 
40 THEODORE MILLON, MASTERS OF THE MIND: EXPLORING THE STORY OF MENTAL ILL­
NESS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 21 (2004). 
41 This approach, introduced in DSM-III, requires evaluation and diagnoses to occur along 
five separate axes. In addition to Axis I (Clinical Disorders) and Axis II (Personality Disorders 
and Mental Retardation), diagnosticians are to indicate "General Medical Conditions" poten­
tially related to the individual's mental disorders (Axis III), the presence of "Psychosocial and 
Environmental Problems" (Axis IV), and the individual's placement on the 100-point Global 
Assessment of Functioning ("OAF.") scale, which rates the overall level of functioning (Axis V). 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 16, at 27-34; see also KuTcHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 270 n.41.. 
42 MILLON, MASTERS OF THE MIND, supra note 40, at 193. 
43 /d. at 116. 
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ing would not be overlooked when giving attention to the frequently 
more urgent and behaviorally dramatic clinical syndromes. "44 
The DSM editors regarded personality disorders as conditions 
separate from "traditional mental disorders," a view that finds support 
in Millon's caution that, although the DSM includes personality disor­
ders (ostensibly in a listing of "mental disorders"), they are not "dis­
crete medical diseases."45 The "causal assumptions" underlying Axis I 
and Axis II diagnoses differ because· the causes of Axis I disorders are 
"localizable," whereas the causes for the personality disorders are "lit­
erally everywhere ... from every domain of functioning."46 Personal­
ity disorders are more analogous to an impairment of the immune 
system, rather than a disease itself.47 
While personality disorders are often regarded differently from 
other mental disorders, the inclusion of personality disorders in the 
DSM's definitive listing of psychiatric disorders conveys the message 
. that psychiatry regards those persons with personality disorders to be 
"ill" in certain respects. Thus, psychiatry has established an ambigu­
ous place for personality disorders within that field. As discussed 
below, this internal ambiguity has implications reaching the treatment 
setting. 
B. The Significance of a Personality Disorder Diagnosis 
Psychiatry does not classify in a vacuum. Diagnosticians are part 
of society as a whole and their attitudes both reflect and influence 
societal attitudes through psychiatric labeling. The socio-legal impli­
cations flowing from psychiatric diagnoses shape the extent to which 
we assign responsibility to persons for their behavior. Personality dis­
orders provide an especially stark example of this feedback loop 
between psychiatry, the leghl system, and society at large. 
44 Jd. at 193. 
45 MILLON, PERSONAUTY DISORDERS, supra note 6, at 9. 
46 ld. at 9-10. 
47 ld. at 8-10. Researchers in the fields of psychology and psychiatry have sought to deter­
mine whether there is a physiological or genetic etiology to personality disorders, which has been 
found to some degree with depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, but the studies have 
not yielded any conclusive findings. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 20, at 61-62. (noting the 
increasing number of studies seeking links between personality disorders and "a biologically­
defined concept of affective disorders") (quoting J.K. KROLL, THE CHALLENGE OF THE BoR­
DERLINE PATIENT. COMPETENCY IN DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 25 (1988)). See a/so Bruce 
Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PsvcHOL. PuB. 
PoL'Y & L. 534, 560-63 (1995). 
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1. The Social Significance 
Elizab~th Emens observed that people discriminate against those 
with mental illness because of the way they make the rest of us feel; 
there is an imposition of "hedonic costs," which she defines as "an 
increase in negative emotions or a loss of positive emotions. "48 Emens 
notes that "[r]esearch on emotional contagion suggests that people 
with mental illness are likely to cause others to share their negative 
emotions. "49 However, our own negative reactions to certain persons 
may be what lead us to label them with mental illness in the first 
place.5° 
Herb Kutchins and Stuart Kirk, social work scholars and leading 
critics of the DSM have commented: . 
Part of the power of DSM derives from its attempt to distinguish 
mental·disorder from other human troubles. Although to some lay­
people the importance of the distinction may not be immediately 
clear, it is an enormously consequential one. DSM is a claim for pro­
fessional jurisdiction by the American Psychiatric Association. The 
broadness of this claim provides justification for the scope of psychiat­
ric expertise and a basis for requests for governmental and private 
· support. But is does more: it proposes how we as a society should 
think about our troubles. By creating categories for certain behaviors, 
DSM determines which behaviors should be considered a result of ill­
ness or disorder and should therefore fall under the purview of psychi­
atrists and other mental health professionals .... DSM is a guidebook 
that tells us how we should think about manifestations of sadness and 
anxiety, sexual activities, alcohol and substance abuse, and many other 
behaviors. Consequently, the categories created for DSM reorient our 
thinking about important social matters and affect our social . 
institutions.51 
48 Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the 
ADA, 94 GEo. L.J. 399, 401 {2006). 
49 Id. 
50 Emens acknowledges that an examination of what constitutes a "mental illness" is 
outside the scope of her article and instead explains that she defined mental illness for purposes 
of her argument largely along the lines of the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV-TR for those 
considerations "typically thought of as psychological disorders, such as mood, anxiety, thought 
and personality disorders ...." ld. at 403. · · 
51 KuTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 11. See Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the 
Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 377,394-423 (1987) (arguing that the 
"mental health legal system" should adopt the "medical model" of mental illness, including the 
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Although the DSM diagnoses bear the stamp of "objective" med­
ical expertise, they are particularly prone to the social dimensions of 
classification; they are "in part social constructions and cultural arti­
facts. "52 Thus, using such diagnoses may be seen as circular or rein­
forcing social attitudes: "Disorders are what doctors treat, and what 
doctors treat is defined by implicit social standards. "53 Society grants 
enormous deference to professionals employing such diagnoses, even 
when the diagnoses implicate one's liberty and legal status.54 
British historian Roy Porter observes in his history of mental ill­
ness: "It is not only cynics who claim that politico-cultural, racial, and 
gender prejudices still shape the diagnosis of what are purportedly 
objective disease syndromes."55 Noting that the DSM has grown from 
134 to 943 pages, Porter comments: "More people than ever seem to 
be diagnosed as suffering from more psychiatric disorders than ever: 
is that progress?"56 
The validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnosis remains con­
troversial,57 which appears particularly true regarding the appropriate-
DSM diagnostic criteria, to determine which mental illnesses may serve as a basis for invoking 
the insanity defense and for evaluating whether a specific individual has a mental illness). 
52 MILLON, PERSONALITY DISORDERS, supra note 6, at 11. 
53 /d. 
54 See Winick, supra note 47, at 554-55. 
The vagueness and breadth of the concept of mental illness in many legal contexts raises 
grave problems, particularly when the legal rules in question effect a deprivation of lib­
erty. The imprecision of statutory criteria in effect allows clinicians who perform evalua­
tions for the courts in these contexts the power to make decisions that in a democracy 
should be made by the legislature. Moreover, their breadth and imprecision both allow 
and mask arbitrariness and discrimination in the application of the law. It is time for the 
law itself to define mental illness for legal purposes instead of incorporating clinical 
notions of the concept. Id. 
55 RoY PoRTER, MADNEss: A BRIEF HISTORY 214 (2002). See also BRADLEY LEWIS, 
MoviNG BEYOND PROZAC, DSM, AND THE NEw PsYCHIATRY: THE BIRTH oF PoSTPSYCHIATRY 
(2006) (using postmodern and poststructuralism approaches to argue that mainstream psychiatry 
has increasingly sought to establish its place as an objective, a theoretical "science" while denying 
its cultural basis). 
56 PoRTER, supra note 55, at 214. 
57 See Ansar M. Haroun & Grant H. Morris, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Deceptions of 
Psychiatrists, 10 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 227, 238-40 (1999) (observing that psychiatrists are 
encouraged by a variety of influences, including legal standards and insurance reimbursement, 
"to find mental disorder in virtually everyone they see"); see also Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Ill­
ness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 295 (1999) (noting that a 
health care provider may engage in "diagnostic dishonesty" due to a variety of motivations, 
including both "economic advocacy" and "forensic advocacy" on behalf of the patient). 
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ness of diagnoses of personality disorders.58 The DSM-IV-TR reports 
that personality disorders occur with significant prevalence in Ameri­
can society.59 Who are these disordered personalities? A leading 
critic of psychiatric labeling, Thomas Szasz, notes that, "the very per­
sons whom psychiatry labels with the term 'personality disorders' are 
the same persons called bad or deviant, sinning or loathsome. . . . 
Those with personality disorders make up a large percentage of peo~ 
ple in jails, on welfare rolls, and in the general practitioner's waiting 
rooms."60 These individuals have mental illnesses, or are classified as 
such, solely because they are "functionally disabled. "61 Szasz observes 
that persons identified as having personality disorders especially resist 
psychiatric "treatment" because they do not feel that they have a dis~ 
order,62 despite possessing the "peculiar capacity to get under the skin 
of others. "63 
Edward Shorter's History of Psychiatry summarizes the state of 
personality disorders succinctly: 
58 The variability of these diagnoses is evident in an employment decision of the Sixth Cir­
cuit, Turner v. City of University Heights, No. 89-3489, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22246 (6th Cir. 
Sept. 9, 1999). The plaintiff was described by a treating psychologist as "confrontational, hot­
tempered, and inappropriately argumentative." /d. at *3. A second psychologist, who reviewed 
the plaintiffs records and conducted an examination, concluded that the plaintiff had a paranoid 
personality disorder. /d. at *6. However, a psychiatrist who conducted an evaluation "opined 
that Turner did not meet any criteria for any psychiatric disorder," although she nonetheless 
noted that he posed an unspecified "low-risk danger to himself and others." /d. at *6-*7 
(emphasis added). The court affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment for the 
defendant on the plaintiff's disability discrimination employment .claim and reasoned that the 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position in light of the psychiatrist's 
observation that he posed some risk of harm if he returned to work. !d. at *15-*16. 
59 The DSM-IV-TR provides the following figures regarding the prevalence of personality 
disorders in the United States: Paranoid (.5-2.5% general population, 10-30% in inpatient psy­
chiatric settings, and 2-10% outpatient psychiatric settings); Schizoid ("uncommon" in clinical 
settings); Schizotypal (3% general population); Antisocial (3% males and 1% females irl com­
munity samples and 3-30% in clinical settings); Borderline (2% of general population, 10% 
outpatient and 20% inpatient psychiatric settings; ranges 30-60% of those with personality dis­
orders); Histrionic (2-3% general population and 10-15% in inpatient and outpatient settings); 
Narcissistic (1% in general population and 2-16% in clinical population); Avoidant (.5-1% in 
general population and 10% outpatient clinical settings); Dependent ("among the most fre­
quently reported Personality Disorders encountered in mental health clinics."); Obsessive-Com­
pulsive (1% community samples and 3-10% clinical settings). DSM-IV-TR, supra note 16, at 
692-728. 
60 THOMAS SzAsz, INSANITY: THE IDEA AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 110 (1987). 
61 Jd. 
62 ld. at 111. 
63 ld. (quoting G.E. Vaillant and J.C. Perry, Personality Disorders, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE 
TEXTBOOK OF PsYCHIATRY 1562 (H.I. Kaplan, A.M. Freedman, et al. eds. 1980)). 
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Personality disorders have become a whole sandbox for empire build­
ing. Although the concept of a disorder of the personality-in which 
everybody suffers but the patient-remains scientifically rather 
murky, in practice imputed personality disorders have taken off.64 
He cautions that "the entire notion of giving patient-status to people 
because they are troublesome to others represent[s]·a pathologizing of 
essentially normal if irksome behavior."65 Shorter comments that 
many of the apparently newly-discovered personality disorders repre­
sented nothing more than exaggerated familiar character traits devel­
oped over each successive volume of the DSM.66 
The "personality disorders" category seems to be where psychiat­
ric classification places those behaviors and actions that psychiatrists 
and American society disfavor.67 Shorter concludes that these person­
ality diagnoses, as well as the other ballooning disease labels, substan­
tially lowered the threshold for labeling someone "ill."68 
2. The Legal Significance 
Psychiatry's unsettled controversy over the nature and signifi­
cance of a personality disorder diagnosis, and the consequent legal 
64 SHORTER, supra note 2, at 291. 
65 /d. 
66 ld. 
67 For example, the original 1952 DSM edition included homosexuality under "Sexual 
Deviation" and classified it as a "personality disorder." In i980, DSM-III dropped the classifica­
tion. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 10, at 57. In general, the APA continues to tinker with the 
place of personality disorders within psychiatric diagnosis and the DSM. The "research agenda" 
for the DSM-V, due out in 2010, acknowledges "notable dissatisfaction with the current concep­
tualization and definition of the DSM-IV-TR personality disorders" and observes that problems 
with Axis II diagnoses indicate the "most important gaps in the DSM-IV.". A RESEARCH 
AGENDA FOR DSM-V 123-124 (Kupfer et al., eds. 2002) available at http://www.appi.org/pdf/ 
kupfer_2292.pdf (last visited on Nov. 25, 2006); see also Michael B. First, M.D., Dimensional 
Models of Personality Disorders: Etiology, Pathology, Phenomenology, and Treatment, available 
at http://dsmS.org/conference3.cfm (last visited on Nov. 25, 2006) (reporting on the outcome of 
the APA's Personality Disorders Conference, held as part of the DSM-V's development and the 
work to create a "dimensional" rather than "categorical" approach to the diagnosis of personal­
ity disorders). 
68 SHORTE~, supra note 2, at 291. For example, the diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder, see supra note 20, introduced in the DSM-IIl, is now one of the most popular diagno­
ses in psychiatry. Carey, supra note 2. Millon has described the diagnosis as follows: "This is 
[sic] seems to me to a kind of diagnosis for our age, this complex, changing, fluid society in which 
young people are not allowed to internalize a coherent picture of who they are. There are too 
many options, too many choices, and there's a sense of, 'I don't know who I am-am I angry, am 
I contrite, happy, sad?' It's the scattered confusion of modern society." /d. 
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implications, emerge in cases regarding the detention of persons with 
personality disorder diagnoses.69 The United States Supreme Court 
has rendered opinions that address the distinction (or lack thereof) 
between personality disorder and mental illness. In Foucha v. Louisi­
ana, the Court held that a state may not detain a person acquitted by 
reason of insanity who no longer suffers from a mental illness because 
of "dangerousness" alone.70 The plaintiff was acquitted on charges of 
aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm by reason of 
insanity and committed to a forensic psychiatric institution for an 
indefinite period.71 In an examination four years l&ter, two "medicf!.l 
doctors"72 found that the plaintiff had recovered from the "drug 
induced psychosis" that served as the basis for his successful insanity 
defense, but had an "antisocial personality, a condition that is not a 
mental disease and that is untreatable.'m The state conceded, perhaps 
based upon the physicians' characterization of antisocial personality 
disorder/4 that Foucha was not mentally ill despite the presence of a 
69 For example, in a recent case from the U.S. District Court in Oregon, Howard v. Rea, a 
state prison inmate serving a sentence for rape, challenged the Oregon Board of Prison and Post­
Prison Supervision's ("Board") decision deferring his parole based on a finding that he was a 
"danger to the community" due to a "severe emotional disturbance." No. CV 02-6255-BR, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43798 (D. Or. June 27, 2005). The Board's decision depended on the results of 
a psychological evaluation that provided a diagnosis of a "mixed personality disorder witq nar­
cissistic, aggressive, and paranoid tendencies" and noted that no medical treatment was available 
because the disorder was learned behavior rather than a mental illness. /d. at *1. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants violated the public services requirements.of the ADA by deferring 
his parole on the basis of a disability and failing to provide access to mental health treatment for 
his alleged "emotional disturbance." /d. at *3. The court held that the Board based its decision 
on ·the plaintiffs "antisocial behavior," not a "mental illness," and that the plaintiff failed to 
identify any specific services that were denied to him. /d. at *4. Thus, even though the plaintiff 
received a DSM-based diagnosis, the court did not regard him as mentally ill because the diagno­
sis simply described his behavior and did not provide a basis to shift responsibility for his con­
duct away from him. /d. ' 
70 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 {1992). See generally Winick, supra note 47 (analyzing 
the narrow concept of mental illness underlying Foucha and arguing that it limits involuntary 
psychiatric hospitalizations to instances in which it is "therapeutically appropriate"). 
71 /d. at 73-74. 
72 The decision does not indicate whether the doctors were psychiatrists. Jd. at 74-75. 

73 /d. at 74-75 (emphasis added). 

74 Although the term Antisocial Personality Disorder was not specifically used in the opin­

ion, the discussion suggests that the physicians intended the diagnosis to fit this DSM category. 
For example, the Court characterized the state's position as asserting that Foucha's "antisocial 
personality was a 'disorder for which there is no effective treatment.'" /d. at 81. Also, Justice 
White, writing for the majority, noted that many criminals who have completed their sentences 
"likely suffer from the same sort of personality disorder that Foucha exhibits." /d. at 85. 
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personality disorder.75 Accordingly, Foucha did not require the Court 
to determine whether an antisocial personality disorder, or any per­
sonality disorder, is a mental illness.76 
Five years later, in Kansas v. Hendricks,71 the nature of "person­
ality disorder" arose again as a category distinct from, but lumped in 
with, "mental abnormality" as a basis to detain a convicted sex 
offender under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.78 The Kan­
sas law established a basis for the state's involuntary civil commitment 
of individuals "convicted of or charged with a sexually violent 
offense" and who suffer from a personality disorder that increases 
their likelihood of committing· another sexually violent act.79 The 
Kansas legislature further reasoned that the "anti-social" personality 
elements that prompt sexually violent behavior are not amenable to 
existing mental illness treatment options.80 
The Hendricks plaintiff challenging the statute had· been diag­
nosed with "personality trait disturbance, passive-aggressive personal­
ity, and pedophilia."81 He argued that the Supreme Court's prior 
decisions, including Foucha, outlining the due process requirements of 
civil commitment or detention established that one could be deprived 
of liberty only after diagnosis of a mental illness, as opposed to a mere 
mental abnormality . 82 The latter term, he argued, was a creation of 
the Kansas legislature not "the psychiatric community."83 In rejecting 
this argument and upholding the Kansas statute, the Court noted: 
Contrary to Hendricks' assertion, the term "mental illness" is devoid 
of any talismanic significance. Not only do "psychiatrists disagree 
75 See, e.g., id. at 86 ("[T]he State now claims that it may continue to confine Foucha, who 
is not now considered to be mentally ill, solely because he is deemed dangerous.") (emphasis 
~~~. . 
76 But see Bruce Winick, Ambiguities In The Legal Meaning And Significance of Mental 
Illness, 1 PsYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 534, 547-48 (1995) (arguing that the determination of 
whether a personality disorder was a mental illness was a legal issue to be resolved in the Foucha 
opinion and that it is possible, although "problematic," to read the majority opinion as holding 
that personality disorders are not mental illnesses for purposes of justifying involuntary 
confinement). 
77 521 u.s. 346 (1997). 
78 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-29a21 (1994). 
79 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a). 
80 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351. 
81 /d. at 354 n.2. 
82 /d. at 358-59 (emphasis added). 
83 /d. at 358-59. 
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widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness," ... but the 
Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe' the mental 
condition of those properly subject to civil confinement. 
Indeed, we have never required State legislatures to adopt any partic­
ular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes. Rather, we 
have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a 
medical nature that have legal significance. . . . As a consequence, the 
States have, over the years, developed numerous specialized terms to 
define mental health concepts. Often, those definitions do not fit pre­
cisely with the definitions employed by the medical community. The 
legal definitions of "insanity" and "competency," for example, vary 
substantially from their psychiatric counterparts .... Legal definitions, 
however, which must "take into account such issues as individual 
responsibility ... and competency," need not mirror those advanced 
by the medical profession. 84 · 
Employing somewhat circular reasoning, the Court also rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the detention was unconstitutional because it 
was potentially long-term and indefinite. The Court noted that the 
statute's aim is not to detain a person on a long-term or indefinite 
basis, but only "until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to 
be a threat to others."85 However, as the Kansas Supreme Court 
noted in striking down the law, the plaintiff did not have a mental 
illness that could be treated or "changed," thereby eliminating any 
prospect for his eventual release.86 · In reversing, the Court side­
stepped. the problem of the plaintiff's potentially indefinite detention, 
and instead held that "incapacitation" (a term left undefined) can be a 
84 /d. at 359 (internal citations omitted). The Court commented that the controversy within 
psychiatry on many of these issues is a reason to grant greater deference to legislative 
resolutions: · 
In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded 
the widest latitude in drafting such statutes. As we ·have explained regarding congres­
sional enactments, when a legislature 'undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and 
scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts shouid be 
cautious not to rewrite legislation.' · 
/d. at 360 n.3 (internal citations omitted). 
85 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364. 
86 In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 1:29, 136 (Kan. 1996). 
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valid basis for denying liberty, even in the absence of any prospect for 
treatment.87 	 · 
As these cases indicate, the classification of personality disorder 
as a mental illness has had specific implications in the involuntary 
detention context. As we shall see in Parts III and IV, infra, the pas­
sage of the ADA created another context in which an individual's 
mental illness label possesses legal significance: the workplace. As a 
result, social liberals who may have resisted the expansion of notions 
of mental disorder due to a desire to avoid restraints on liberty now 
see the potential for expansion of civil rights in employment for those 
who are so labeled. Conversely, social conservatives, who may other­
wise favor the "labeling" and control of those persons i4entified as ill 
object to the diagnosis if it yields "protection" from societ~ 
discrimination. 
II. 	 THE ADA AND THE IRKSOME EMPLOYEE 
Psychiatry's pathologizing and medicalizing of certain behavior, 
conduct, and personalities, as described above, creates a tension in the 
plain language application of the ADA that prohibits discrimination 
based upon an individual's serious medical condition. Some fear that, 
if medicine applies a diagnosis to an individual, the "afflicted" individ­
ual may seek and obtain the protections and accommodations 
afforded to people with disabilities under the ADA. However, the 
cases below demonstrate that this does not generally occur when 
plaintiffs with actual or perceived personality disorders invoke the law 
to redress adverse employment actions. To avoid shifting responsibil­
ity for undesirable conduct away from individuals, the result-oriented 
opinions . under the ADA uniformly minimize the pathology and 
emphasize the personality. 
A. 	 An Overview of the Employment Discrimination Provisions of 
the ADA 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990.88 However, it was not the 
first federal law to extend civil rights protection to people with disabil­
87 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66. However, the Court appeared to take comfort from Kan­
sas's assertions that, at the time of argument, individuals committed under the Act received an 
average of 31.5 hours of "treatment" each week. /d. at 368. 
88 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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ities in the workplace. In 1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation 
Act to prohibit discrimination against "otherwise qualified" people 
with disabilities by federal agencies and programs receiving federal 
financial assistance.89 By enacting Title 190 of the ADA, Congress 
intended to extend the protections enjoyed by employees in federally 
funded programs and federal agencies to the private sector.91 
Title I the ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability 
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment. "92 
This broad prohibition contains several dimensions that reflect the 
varied ways that persons with disabilities may encounter discrimina­
tion on the job. For example, a claim may be brought not only for a 
failure to hire or for termination, but also for employing criteria that 
tend to screen out people with disabilities,93 for failing to provide a · 
reasonable accommodation,94 for requiring applicants or employees to 
undergo medical examinations,95 or for retaliation. 96 
89 29 U.S.C. § 794 provides, in pertinent part: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... solely by 
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the bene­
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency 
or by the United States Postal Service. 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). Other provisions of the Rehabilitation Act require affirmative action 
plans and programs for people with disabilities within every federal agency and most federal 
contractors. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (2000). 
90 Congress enacted five "Titles" of the ADA, 101 Pub. L No. 336 (1990): 1) Title I applies 
to employment in both the public and private sector (101 Pub. L. No. 336, §§ 101-108, (enacting 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117)); 2) Title II prohibits discrimination by public entities in the provision 
of programs and services (101 Pub. L. No. 336. §§ 201-246 (enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117)); 
3) Title III prohibits discrimination by "public accommodations" in the provision of goods and 
.services and in furnishing transportation (101 Pub. L. 336, §§ 301-310 (enacting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132)); 4) Title IV requires telephone companies to provide relay services for individuals who 
use 1TY and similar equipment and requires television stations to close-caption federally­
funded public service announcements (101 Pub. L. No. 336, §§ 401-402 (amending 27 U.S.C. 
§ 225)); and 5) Title V contains several "miscellaneous" provisions (101 Pub. L. No. 336, 
§§ 501-514). 
91 Prior to 1990, some states had already accomplished this through state non-discrimina­
tion statutes. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
93. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(6) (2000). 

94 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 

95 42 u.s.c. § 12112(d) (2000). 

96 See, e.g., Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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The starting point for any claim is whether the plaintiff can claim 
protection as a "qualified individual with a disability" under the stat­
ute.97 Only after this requirement is satisfied will a· court consider 
whether the employee ~uffered an adverse employment action 
because of the disability.98 
The statute's conception of "disabled" individuals consists of 
three broad categories: 1) those who have a physical or mental 
impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities;99 
2) persons with records of such an impairment;100 or 3) persons who 
are "regarded as" having such an impairment.101 A mental impair­
. ment is defined as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as 
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill­
ness, and specific learning disabilities. "102 
A plaintiff is a "qualified" individual with a disability if she can 
perform the essential functions of the job in question, with or without 
reasonable accommodation. 103 An "essential function" is one that has 
a more than marginal relationship to the job.104 If the plaintiff is not 
able to perform the job's functions, a court must consider whether 
some reasonable accommodation could enable her to do so.105 
Significantly, the ADA's drafters did not define "disability" based 
upon a medical or diagnostic approach,106 but on a functional 
97 42 o.s.c. § 12111(8) (2ooo). 
98 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA regime has enabled the vast majority of 
federal appeals courts to hold that a plaintiff need not prove that her disability was the sole 
motivating factor behind the adverse employment action, but that it was a motivating factor. 
McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Head v. 
Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063-66, 1064 n.55 (9th Cir. 2005) (following McNely and 
additional cases that hold that plaintiffs need not establish disability-based discrimination as the 
sole basis of adverse employment action). But see Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys. & Forum 
Health, 355 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 817 (2004) (holding that, .in order to 
prevail on ADA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that disability was the sole basis for the 
adverse employment action). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
too 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2000). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). Title I also prohibits discrimination based upon association 
with a person with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2000). · 
102 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2000). 
103 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8) {2000). 
104 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2000). 
105 In this sense, the notion of reasonable accommodation is built into the definition of 
disability. 
106 However, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Enforcement Gui­
dance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities, states that the current 
edition of the DSM (DSM-IV), "is relevant for identifying [mental or psychological] disorders. 
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approach (i.e., substantial limitation in one or more major life activi­
ties), which was used in the regulations promulgated under the Reha­
bilitation Act's definition of "disability."107 Specifically, the functional 
approach 
views many limitations resulting from actual or perceived disabilities 
as flowing, not from limitations of the individual, but, rather, from the 
existence of unnecessary barriers to full participation in society and its 
institutions, ... in contrast to the medical model of disability that cen­
ters on assessments of the degree of a person's functionallimitation. 108 
This framework is sometimes referred to as the "Social Model of 
Discrimination. "109 
The majority of ADA employment discrimination claims filed 
with courts result in favorable outcomes for employers because in 
most cases the plaintiff fails to establish that she is a "person with a 
disability" in pre-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of her 
claims.110 A series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
The DSM-IV has been recognized as an important reference by the courts and is widely used by 
American mental health professionals for diagnostic and insurance .reimbursement purpos~s." 8 
FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7461, 405:7462 (2003) ("Enforcement Guidance"), available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html (last visited :Nov. 25, 2006). It also notes that not all condi­
tions listed in the DSM-IV "are disabilities, or even impairments." Enforcement Guidance at 
405:7462, 405:7462-63 nn.7-12. Cf. Boldinia v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 
1995) (noting in a Rehabilitation Act case that a court "may give weight to the diagnosis of 
mental impairment .which is described in" the DSM). 
107 This definition sharply contrasts with the Social Security Act, which determines disabil­
ity and qualification for benefits by first using a set of "listings" with specific conditions and then 
a functional determination of vocational limitation. 42 U.S.C. § 423{d){2){C) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3) (2000); 20 C.F.R. 404.1520{a)( 4)(iii) (2006). Earlier versions of the ADA included 
a list of covered conditions, but this approach was ul~imately rejected in favor of the Rehabilita­
tion Act approach. Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It? 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
91, 127-34 (2000). 
108 NATIONAL CouNCIL oN DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 109 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 
2006). See generally SrMr LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY (New York Univ. Press 1998); LEN­
.NARD DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY (Verso 1995). 
109 NATIONAL CouNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 108, at 109. 
110 Ruth Calker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 110-33 (1999}; James G. Frierson, Heads You Lose, Tails You Lose: 
A Disturbing Judicial Trend in Defining Disability, 1997 LAB. L.J. 419, 419-24, 426-28 (1997); 
Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 107, 123-31 {1997). See gener­
ally, NATIONAL CouNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 108, at 44-74; Kathryn Moss, et al., Preva­
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severely restricted the definition of disability in several important 
respects, with far-reaching impact.111 These decisions markedly con­
trast with the case law under the Rehabilitation Act, in which the 
question of whether an individual was in fact handicapped was rarely 
litigated.112 Due to the courts' construction of the ADA's functional 
approach to defining disability, thereby requiring a case-by-case scru­
tiny of every plaintiff's claimed disability, numerous cases have been 
dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Notably, courts have 
declined to find some plaintiffs with serious conditions (such as can­
cer113 and multiple sclerosis 114) to be "disabled" under this functional 
or social model of disability.115 
While many disability rights commentators note Title I's limited 
reach with disappointment,116 that disappointment is more pro­
nounced among advocates for persons with mental illness. Many com­
mentators117 agree that persons with psychiatric illness have fared far 
lence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 
MENTAL PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303 (May/June 2005); Amy Albright, 2004 Employment 
Decisions Under the ADA Title I- Survey Update, 29 MENT. PHYs. Dis. L. REP. 513, 513 (July/ 
Aug. 2005) (reporting that, "[i]n all but a handful of cases, employers won on motions for sum­
mary judgment or to dismiss, due to plaintiff employee's failure to meet the prima facie case of 
discrimination"). 
111 Toyota Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 534 U.S.184, 200-01 (2002) (holding that plaintiff claiming 
to be limited in the major life activity of "work;" must demonstrate that she is unable to perform 
a variety of tasks central to most people's lives, not just the tasks required by her previous job); 
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (holding that available "mitigating mea­
sures" must be considered when determining the extent and impact of a person's disability); 
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that "the determination of 
petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs"). See gen­
erally Feldblum, supra note 107, at 139-60. 
112 Feldblum, supra note 107, at 107. 
113 Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plain­
tiff with breast cancer was not disabled). 
114 See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996) {holding the 
plaintiff, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, failed to establish that she was regarded as 
disabled). 
115 See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486-87 (noting that as a result of Congress's decision to adopt a 
"functional" approach to defining disability, as opposed to one based upon diagnosis per se, the 
number of people covered under the ADA is significantly smaller than it would be under a 
"nonfunctional" approach). 
116 See, e.g., RUTH CaLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE oF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr (New York Univ. Press 2005); BACKLASH AGAINST THE 
ADA: REINTERPRETING DisABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 
2003); see also Albright, supra note 110, at 516 (reporting that forty-one of the futy-four deci­
sions (76%) in 2004 in ADA "mental illness" claims were "wins" for the employer). 
117 See SusAN STEFAN, HoLLOW PRoMISEs: EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES {Am. Psycho!. Ass'n 2002) (surveying the particular chal­
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worse than persons with physical disabilities, and have not benefited 
froin the gains of the disability rights movement.118 Indeed, recent 
empirical studies of claim outcomes may lend some support to this 
perception, although individual studies have reached son;tewhat differ­
ent findings.ll 9 The legal and social challenges are then even more 
lenges facing people with mental illness in the workplace and the legal remedies available to 
address claims of discrimination); Emens, supra note 48; Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Menta/Illness 
Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585 (2003) (examining how people with mental 
illness have fared in claims brought under the ADA); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Ameri­
cans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and The Americans With Disabili­
ties Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 271, 273 {2000) (concluding that "people with psychiatric disabilities 
have received minimal benefit from the ADA's protections against employment discrimina­
tion"); Randel I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, 86 CoRNELL L. REv. 927 (2001) (arguing that the ADA's three-prong definition of disa­
bility presents unique problems for people with mental illness, particularly in light of recent 
Supreme Court case law regarding the defmition of disability under the statute); Stephanie Proc­
tor Miller, Comment, Keeping The Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the 
.Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701 (1997) (finding that courts inappropriately 
rely upon Rehabilitation Act precedent when applying the ADA in claims brought by people 
with mental illness); Michelle Parikh, Note: Burning The Candle At Both Ends, And There Is 
Nothing Left For Proof' The Americans With Disabilities Act's Disservice To Persons With 
Mental Illness, 89 CoRNELL L. REv 721, 725 (2004) (describing ways in which the ADA "dis­
serves" plaintiffs with mental illness seeking protection under the statute). 
118 NAT'L CouNCIL oN DisABILITY, FROM PRIVILEGES TO RIGHTS: PEoPLE LABELED 
WITH PsYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, 2000, available at http://www.ncd.gov/ 
newsroom/publications/2000/pdf/privileges.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2006). Basing their findings 
on information gathered from public hearings and additional investigation, the authors noted 
that the primary proponents of the ADA are part of a larger group who have left persons with 
mental illness in this second-tier status: 
The disability rights and independent living movements have in most cases failed to 
defend with equal passion the rights 11nd humanity of people with psychiatric disabilities. 
While discrimination and abuse toward people with physical disabilities stirs indignation, 
at the same time we barely notice that people with psychiatric disabilities endure both on 
a daily basis. Unfortunately, like most Americans, the disability rights and independent 
living movements are still too quick to accept powerful demonizing stereotypes that peo­
ple with psychiatric disabilities are crazy, dangerous, stupid, and evil. Recognizing and 
eliminating these prejudices will empower people with psychiatric disabilities to achieve 
the same self-determination now available to many of their peers with physical disabili­
ties, and to build a strong, unified cross-disability movement. 
/d. at 18. 
1t 9 See Jeffrey Swanson et a!., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat 
People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly? 66 Mo. L. REv. 94 (2006) (concluding, based upon the 
authors' study of 537 ADA employment claims, that people with psychiatric disability fared sig­
nificantly worse in employment discrimination lawsuits than plaintiffs with nonpsychiatric disa­
bilities). But see Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: 
An Empirical Look at the Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN.L. REv. 47, 65-66 
(2006) (finding some slight disparities between the outcomes of plaintiffs with psychiatric disabil­
ities and those without, most notably in the formers' more limited success in demonstrating that 
they are qualified for the jobs in question). · 
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pronounced for those with personality disorders, who are significantly 
impaired in their social functioning. As discussed above, the DSM­
IV-TR notes that the individual's relation to the expectations of his or 
her culture reveals the "essential feature" of personality disorders. 120 
Thus, by definition, persons with personality disorders engage in con­
duct that fails to meet the "expectations" of modern American soci­
ety. The question presented by the ADA is to what extent, if at all, 
society must accommodate that failure. However, courts' application 
of the "disability" definition to these cases has deferred response to 
that question. 
B,. 	 The Role of Personality in ADA Disparate Treatment Cases 
Notions of "personality" have limited the relief sought by persons 
alleging actual or perceived mental illness. This limitation can be 
traced by reviewing the debate over whether to include mental ill­
ness-and specifically personality disorders-in the ADA's scope and 
exploring how some of the concerns regarding disagreeable employ­
ees raised immediately before and after the ADA's enactment emerge 
in the case law. In particular, courts' attempts to distinguish between 
personality and mental illness restrict the class of employees who can 
seek the ADA's protection by excluding social functioning as a "major 
life activity" and including such functioning as a potential "essential 
function" of a job. The result is a safe harbor for any employer taking 
an adverse employment action based upon an employee's allegedly 
objectionable personality. 
1. 	 The Pre- and Post-Enactment Debate on Including Personality 
Disorders in the ADA's Scope · 
An examination of the application of the ADA to persons with 
personality disorders begins with the congressional debate that pre­
ceded passage. While few in Congress questioned the general concept 
of extending civil rights in employment to persons traditionally 
regarded as being disabled-primarily those with sensory or mobility 
impairments-there was considerable controversy over including per­
sons with mental illness within the statute's scope.121 Indeed, while 
Congress ultimately adopted a functional approach to defining disabil­
ity generally, Congress excluded individuals with certain specific 
120 See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text. 
121 See Feldblum, supra note 107, at 129-33. 
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mental disorder diagnoses from coverage under the ADA. 122 During 
congressional debate, a small group of senators attempted to elimi­
nate all individuals with DSM diagnoses from the statute's 
protections.123 
Seven years after the ADA's passage, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") released its Enforcement Gui­
dance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabili­
ties ("Enforcement Guidance").124 The Enforcement Guidance 
specifically includes "personality disorders" in its list of "emotional or 
mental illness[es]" covered under the ADA's definition of "mental 
impairment" and fleshed out in the agency's regulations. 125 However, 
the agency specifically notes, "traits or behaviors are not, in them­
selves, mental impairments ... although they may be linked to mental 
impairments."126 This distinction between "impairments" and "traits" 
also appears in the agency's commentary on the EEOC's interpretive 
regulations.127 
Opposition to including persons with mental illness in the 
employment context only increased after the ADA's enactment and 
the issuance of the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance. The United 
122 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000) (Under the ADA, "disability" is defined to not include: 
"1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders 
not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; 2) compulsive gam­
bling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or 3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from cur­
rent illegal use of drugs."). 
123 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications 
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 451 (1991) ("At 
one point, Senator [William] Armstrong stood ori the Senate floor and pointed to a long list of 
conditions in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychi­
atric Association as an example of all the conditions included. His remarks raised the specter of 
a potential roll call on individual amendments to remove each of these conditions.") (citing 135 
CoNG. REc. S10765-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong)); see also Peld­
blum, supra note 107, at 131 n.212 (commenting that Senator Armstrong once proposed an 
amendment to exclude a large number of mental disorders from the ADA, but negotiations 
narrowed the list to the conditions now found in § 12211(b)). Senator Armstrong subsequently 
issued a statement a week after the passage of the ADA on the issue of "ADA, Mental Impair­
ments, and the Private Sector," in which he warned of the "potentially disruptive" effects of the 
inclusion of mental impairments, such as borderline personality disorder and schizoid personal­
ity disorder, in the ADA. Jd. (citing 135 CoNG. REc. 19,853, 19,884-85). 
124 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 106. 
125 /d. at n.6 (citing 29 C.P.R. § 1630.2(b)(2)). 
126 /d. at n.13. 
127 Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA, 29 C.P.R. app. § 1630 ("[T]he definition [of 
disability under the ADA] does not include comtnpn personality traits such as poor judgment or 
a quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder."). 
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States Commission on Civil Rights ("USCCR") released a report after 
two days of public hearings in November 1998 on the EEOC's 
enforcement of the law.128 The USCCR reported on the "national 
media frenzy" that accompanied the release of the EEOC's Enforce­
ment Guidance, including "editorials painting nightmare scenarios of 
manipulative substandard employees with headings such as 'Employ­
ers are Terrified.' "129 Some of those persons testifying before the 
Commission urged the elimination of psychiatric disorders from the 
ADA's coverage.130 
The extension of civil rights to persons with personality disorders, 
which the EEOC confirmed by referencing personality disorders in 
the Enforcement Guidance, sparked specific controversy and com­
ment. One commentator warned that the inclusion of personality 
disorders 
provides a plethora of new opportunities for problem employees to 
disguise their misconduct as disease. Although a nasty or 
insubordinate employee might not qualify as disabled if his bad atti­
tude is considered in isolation, if his attitude can be linked somehow 
to a personality disorder, he will be considered to have an "impair­
ment" that may qualify for ADA coverage.131 
A management-side attorney testified that the definition of disability 
for mental impairments should be limited to "Axis I Clinical Disor­
ders," which ·would exclude all categories of personality disorders.132 
Thus, defense attorneys were primed from the outset to challenge the 
extension of the ADA to problem employees. As the following 
128 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Sharing the Dream: Is the ADA Accommodating All?, ch. 
5 {2000) [hereinafter USCCR], available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/pubsndx.htm (follow 
"Disability" hyperlink; then follow "Sharing the Dream: Is the· ADA Accommodatuig All?" 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
129 Jd. See also Mollie Weighner Marti & Peter David Blanck, Attitudes, Behavior, and 
ADA Title J in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr: 
IssuEs IN LAw, PuBLIC PoLICY, AND RESEARCH 359-61 (Peter David Blanck ed. 2000) (noting 
that empirical studies of employers' and co-workers' attitudes towards persons with disabilities 
in the workplace revealed "extreme negative attitudes" towards persons with mental illness and 
addiction). 
130 USCCR, supra note 128, at n.121 (quoting Roger Clegg). 
131 Jd. at n.33 (quoting James J. McDonald, Jr.). See also James J. McD.onald, Jr. & 
Jonathan P. Rosman, EEOC Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities: Many Problems, Few Worka­
ble Solutions, 23 EMP. RELATIONs L.J.·5, 8 (1997). 
132 USCCR, supra note 128, at nn.31-3z' (quoti~g Jonathan Mook). 
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review of cases demonstrates, they achieved far more success in the 
courts than in Congress in excluding such employees from the ADA's 
scope. 
2. 	 The Courts' Attempts to Distinguish Personality from Mental 
Illness 
Despite early concerns about the inclusion of personality disor­
ders as disabilities for purposes of the ADA, employers have had 
nothing to fear in this regard. Courts approached this issue by relying 
on an assumption that there is a true and identifiable distinction 
between "mental disorders," which are covered under the ADA, and 
"personality traits," which are not. This means that "personality," 
unlike disability, can figure into employment decisions without run­
ning afoul of the law. This approach makes sense on a theoretical 
level because society functions through personality "discrimination." 
In the workplace, employees are evaluated at the hiring, retention, 
and promotion stages based upon their performance in the area of 
"interpersonal skills": communication, cooperation, teamwork, cus­
tomer service, pleasantness, and so forth. Indeed, we choose our 
friends and life partners based in large part on their personalities. 
Accordingly, few would argue that legislation should compel an 
employer to suffer an "utter jerk" in the workplace. 
However, as Part I discussed, the distiJ:iction between "personal­
ity traits" and "mental illness" is not the cleat result of empirical sci­
ence or medicine, but is socially constructed. Therefore, the 
distinction is particularly susceptible to controversy, arbitrary use, and 
misuse. As Susan Stefan notes: 
[M}any of the most crucial and salient symptoms or characte,ristics of 
mental disability can be considered 'common personality traits.' 
These include the inability to tolerate stress, difficulties with interper­
sonal and social relationships, and periodic difficulties in focusing and 
concentration. As the literature confirms, mental disability is not 
something separate and apart from personality, it simply represents 
extremes along a variety of cognitive and affective continua.133 
Nonetheless, in implementing the ADA, courts seek and sometimes 
purport to find a clear line between "mental illness," which implicates_ 
133 STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES, supra note 117, at 63. 
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the ADA's provisions, and mere "personality traits," which employers 
may handle as they see fit. As one district court declared in a recent 
decision: "Emotional volatility or imbalance is not a disability .... As 
a matter of law, 'personality conflicts among coworkers (even those 
~xpressed through the use [or misuse] of mental health terminology) 
generally do not establish a perceived impairment on the part of the 
employer.' "134 · In other words, courts have adopted an "I know it 
when I see it" 135 case-by-case approach to drawing that line. 
For example, in Stewart v. County of Brown, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary 
judgment order in favor of the employer who required the plaintiff­
employee to undergo a number of psychological evaluations and then 
transferred him to another position, even though the evaluations indi­
cated that he was "fit for duty. "136 The plaintiff alleged that his 
employer regarded him as disabled, pointing to the employer's refer­
ral for the psychological evaluations and the employer's statements to 
third persons that plaintiff was "temperamentally unfit to serve as a 
sheriff's deputy" and was "emotionally or psychologically 
imbalanced. "137 The appeals panel rejected these arguments and con­
cluded that the case "boil[ ed] down to nothing more ·than 
personalities. "138 
Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 139 decided within the first years 
of the ADA,140 reveals a federal district court's struggle to locate and 
grasp the illness/personality distinction. Although the plaintiff was 
never diagnosed with any mental impairment, the record on summary 
134 Mickens v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (quoting 
Lanman v. Johnson County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
135 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to the 
line between "bard-core" pornography and material that is within the scope of the First Amend­
ment's protections). 
136 Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107 (7th Cir. 1996). 
137 /d. at 111. The recent decision in Mickens v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 430 F. Supp. 2d 
1265 (M.D. Fla. 2006), is based upon a similar fact pattern, with a similar outcome. The district 
court granted the defendant-employer's post-trial motion as a matter of law on claims brought 
by a terminated assistant principal who alleged that the defendant regarded him to be mentally 
ill. /d. at 1283. The school had required the plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation 
based upon concerns about his apparent "emotional volatility." Jd. at 1274-75. 
138 /d. 
139 920 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ala. 1996). 
140 Title I became effective for employers with twenty-five or more employees on July 26, 
1992 and for employers with fifteen or more employees beginning on July 26, 1994. Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, § 108; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) 
(linking definition of "employer" to employer size and effective date). 
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judgment indicated that she experienced a significant number of 
problems in the workplace, most notably a "negative attitude," 
"insubordination," and an "argumentative and uncooperative" atti­
tude.141 The employer sent the plaintiff to a career counselor who rec­
ommended (to the employer) that the plaintiff undergo long-term 
individual counseling.142 After she was terminated by her employer, 
the plaintiff challenged the termination in an ADA claim. Plaintiff 
did not allege that she had a disability, but rather that her employer 
"perceived her as being mentally disabled, "143 thereby invoking the 
"regarded as"144 prong of the definition of disability. 
The trial court admitted that it was "particularly troubled" by the 
"'perceived disability' analysis" as applied to the facts before it. It 
explained: 
The evidence is equally protective of Pouncy's position that the 
defendants viewed Pouncy as having a mental illness that was interfer­
ing with her ability to perform her job as it is of the Vulcan's position 
that Pouncy. merely had poor behavioral traits and performance 
problems.145 
For purposes of summary judgment, the court felt compelled to 
assume that the plaintiff had established that the defendant perceived 
her as having a mental impairment.146 In a lengthy footnote, however, 
the court explained its discomfort with the analysis it believed the stat­
ute and regulations warranted.147 While the regulations state that the 
"regarded as" provision was intended to combat '"unfounded myth[s], 
fear[s], and stereotype[s],"'148 the regulations also provide that "indi­
, victuals with common personality traits such as poor judgment or a 
quick tempei: are not considered disabled. "149 The district court .also 
noted that in the absence of any diagnosis of mental impairment, the 
141 Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1573-74. 
142 /d. at 1576. 
143 /d. at 1577-78. 
144 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2)(C) (2000). 
145 Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1580. 
146 /d. 

147 !d. at 1580 n.8. 

148 /d. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1)). 
149 !d. 
108 CIVIL RroHTs LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 17:1 
plaintiff's personality alone seemed to be the cause of her problerns.150 
The court looked to other opinions that defined "disability" as exclud­
ing "commonplace conditions such as personality traits."151 
The Pouncy court found the record before it to be "strikingly sim­
ilar" to that before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a 
Rehabilitation Act case, Daley v. Koch.152 In that case, pre-employ­
ment psychological profile tests revealed that the plaintiff-candidate 
had "poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse con­
trol," and therefore was unsuitable for the position of police officer. 153 
Such traits, the appeals court noted, do not rise to the level of impair­
ment.154 The Pouncy court expressed concern that the "purpose of the 
[ADA] will be compromised" if the traits presented in the record were 
given statutory protection.155 However, the employer's encourage­
ment that the plaintiff seek counseling saved the plaintiff's claims at 
the summary judgment stage because it lent support to her contention 
that the employer regarded her as mentally ill. 156 Ultimately, the 
court concluded that she did not establish that the defendant regarded 
her as substantially limited in a major life activity, that she was not 
"qualified," and that there was no evidence giving rise to an inference 
of discrimination.157 
The personality-versus-illness question is related to and some­
times overlaps with how to accommodate workplace "misconduct" 
'that is a manifestation of a mental illness. ·As a general matter, it is 
reasonable to permit employers to discharge or discipline employees 
who behave badly. However, mental illness primarily manifests itself 
through "conduct," and therefore adverse employment actions may 
have a disparate impact on people with mental illness.158 Since the 
ADA protects the disability, not the misconduct, cases involving dis­
. 150 Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1580 n.8. Thus, the court may have taken comfort in a person­
ality disorder diagnosis of the plaintiff by a mental health professional, even if such diagnosis 
was nothing more than another way of stating that her personality was the source of her work 
problems. 
151 ld. (citing Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 
(4th Cir. 1986); Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Va. 1994)). 
152 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989). 
153 ld. at 214. 
154 ld. at 215. 
155 Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1580 n.8. 
156 ld. 
157 Jd. 
158 Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabili­
ties Act, 57 FLA. L. REv. 187, 188-89 (2005). 
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charge following misconduct generally result in favorable outcomes 
for the employer .159 
3. 	 Courts' Approaches to Claims Brought by Persons with 
Personality Disorder Diagnoses 
Those cases in which the plaintiff has been diagnosed with a per­
sonality disorder reveal that, when making a pretrial determination as 
to whether an employee's conduct implicates a protected disability or 
merely some kind of disfavored personality trait, courts will invariably 
rule in the employer's favor. 160 It should be noted that there is no 
clear category of "personality disorder cases." Overall, as compared 
with the prevalence of personality disorders reported in the DSM-IV­
TR, there are few ADA cases in which the plaintiff asserts a personal­
ity disorder.161 Indeed, it is rare that a personality disorder diagnosis 
constitutes the sole or even primary diagnosis in a case; rather, it is 
usually one of several conditions asserted as the basis for actual or 
perceived disability. Further, many of the cases discussed in this sec­
tion involve claims seeking relief under several legal theories, only 
one of which is disability discrimination. 162 
159 !d. at 294 (arguing that "courts should scrutinize the record for evidence of pretext, 
keeping in mind that employers may view misconduct committed by employees with mental 
disabilities more severely because of the stigma and stereotypes associated with such disabili­
ties"). Cf Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995) {differentiating between 
conduct that cine can control and that which is beyond control, drunk-driving versus seizure, 
which represents specific judgments and assumptions about the nature of mental illness). Taking 
a more thoughtful. approach to this issue, the Tenth Circuit noted that mental illness manifests 
itself by abnormal behavior and reasoned that "[t]o permit employers carte blanche to terminate 
employees with mental disabilities on the basis of any abnormal behavior would largely nullify 
the ADA's protection of the mentally disabled." Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 
1076, 1087 (lOth Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit requires the employer to demonstrate that the 
conduct standard the plaintiff allegedly violated must be "job-related and consistent with busi- • 
ness necessity" before it may serve as a defense to discharge based upon disability-related mis­
conduct. !d. at 1086 n.8; see also Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Comprehensive analyses of this specific problem have been undertaken by others and the issue 
is outside the scope of this Article. See generally Timmons, supra note 158; see also, Laura F. 
Rothstein, The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Performance and Conduct Deficiencies of 
Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Discrimination Laws, 47 SYRACUSE L. 
REv. 931 (1997). 
160 See also STEFAN, HoLLOW PRoMISES, supra note 117, at 61-65. 
161 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Pilman v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 214 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (raising 
claims on the basis of race, retaliation, and disability discrimination); Haskins v. New Venture 
Gear, No. 3:01-CV-0135-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4552 (D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2002) (raising claims on 
the basis of race, age, gender, retaliation, and disability). 
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In 2000, Susan Stefan, an attorney with the Center for Public 
Representation reviewed more . than 800 disability-discrimination 
cases filed by persons claiming psychiatric disabilities and r~ported 
that only sixty-seven were filed by individuals who disclosed a person­
ality disorder. 163 This author's review of the case law suggests that the 
percentage of cases filed by those alleging personality disorders may 
in fact be lower now than at the time of Stefan's analysis since the 
bulk of the reported decisions involving such claims appear to have 
been decided within the first decade of the ADA's effective date.164 
Indeed, the EEOC does not even maintain statistics specifically on 
claims filed with that agency by those with personality disorders. 165 
Why is there an apparent under-representation of plaintiffs claim­
ing discrimination based upon a personality disorder in comparison 
with other psychiatric illnesses? Stefan suggests, "the levels of stigma 
and discrimination against people with these diagnoses are so high 
that people with these diagnoses either do not want to disclose the 
diagnosis, cannot obtain counsel, or have given up on any chance of 
having discriminatory activity against them punished or corrected. "166 
She notes that the USCCR's 1998 report on disability discrimination 
included comments from those who wondered whether the EEOC "is 
requiring an employer to accommodate behaviors such as the para­
noid employee's penchant for spreading false and destructive rumors, 
the borderline employee's manipulation of supervisors and coworkers, 
the histrionic employee's sexually provocative dress and innuendo, or 
the narcissistic manager's insensitivity and denigration of subordi­
163 Stefan, Delusions ofRights, supra note 20, at 279 n.46. Presumably, her count includes 
plaintiffs who claim to have additional psychiatric impairments. 
164 Data and conclusions of review on file with author. 
165 The EEOC tracks claims based on the asserted disability's nature and allocates claims 
based on mental illness to the following categories: Alcoholism, Anxiety Disorder, Autism, 
Depression, Drug Addiction, Learning Disabilities, Manic Depressive Disorder, Mental Retar­
dation, Schizophrenia, and Other Psychological Disorders. Presumably, cases involving a per­
sonality disorder as the primary diagnosis would fall under the "other" category. This group 
(which would certainly include disorders other than personality disorders), comprises approxi­
mately 3.2% of all claims filed with and resolved in some way by the EEOC from July 26, 1992 to 
September 30, 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-resolutions.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
By way of comparison, Depression was raised in 6.7% of claims, Anxiety in 2.6%, Manic 
Depressive Disorder in 1.8%; and Schizophrenia in 0.4%. /d. Note that these numbers do not · 
include "regarded as" claims, which account for 11.1% of those filed to date. /d. 
166 Stefan, Delusions of Rights, supra note 20, at 278. 
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nates."167 Another reason could be that persons with personality dis­
orders may not identify themselves as "disabled" as readily as those 
with Axis I diagnoses,168 and therefore may be less likely to use the 
ADA as a vehicle to enforce their rights. 
Of course, would-be plaintiffs may also face the practical chal­
lenge of finding attorneys to take their cases. Attorneys may feel sym­
pathy for the employers and co-workers of the plaintiffs in these cases 
and therefore be unwilling to press such a claim. Attorneys might also 
be wary of representing someone \vho shows signs of being a "prob­
lem client" by having a personality disorder diagnosis. Further, since 
plaintiffs alleging personality disorders rarely proceed past the initial 
pleading or summary judgment stages of their lawsuits, it should not 
be surprising that, as these losses fill the books, attorneys are increas­
ingly reluctant to take on cases involving personality disorder 
claims.169 
167 ld. at 278-79 (quoting U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Helping Employers Comply with 
the ADA: An Assessment of How the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
is Enforcing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 122 (1998)). 
168 This supposition is based upon Szasz's observation that those with personality disorder 
diagnoses often dispute that they have a mental disorder at all. See supra notes 60-63 and 
accompanying text. 
169 Although no empirical survey has been conducted, a review of the case law suggests an 
overrepresentation of "personality disorder" cases brought by pro se plaintiffs. This fact implies 
that individuals who feel wronged have a difficult time finding attorneys, who generally 
represent ADA plaintiffs on a contingent-fee basis, willing to gamble on their disability discrimi­
nation claims. See, e.g., Pilman v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 64 Fed. App'x 293 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Marshall v. Metal Container Corp., No. 98-1595, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27863 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 
1998); Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1997); Limwongse v. N.Y. State Office of Mental 
Health, No. 03-CV-5273, 2005 WL 2786966 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2005); McRae v. Potter, No. 98­
1595, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6977 (D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002); Brown v. Affiliated Computer Servs., 
No. 3:01-CV-0135-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6392 (D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2002); Haskins v. New Ven­
ture Gear, No. 3:01-CV-0135-P: 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4552 (D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2002); Madonia v. 
Mavo Leasing, Inc., No. 98 C 601, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5488 (D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2000); Tokar v. 
City of Chicago, No. 98 C 601, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19863 (D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1999); DiBenedetto 
v. City of Reading, No. 96-CV-5055, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804 (D. Pa. July 16, 1998}; 
Edwards v. WINCO Mfg. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D. Mo. 1998); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19008 (D. Ga. Aug. 28, 1996); Ellison v. North­
west Airlines, 938 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Haw. 1996); McCready v. Michigan State Bar Standing 
Comm. on Character & Fitness, 926 F. Supp. 618 (D. Mich. 1995); Palmer v. Circuit Court, Social 
Serv. Dep't, 905 F. Supp. 499 (D. Ill. 1995); Kerner v. Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1995}; 
Gent v. Gordon, No. 94-75-A, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21874 (D. Va. Mar. 15, 1995). Not surpris­
ingly, these prose plaintiffs rarely prevail on defendants' pre-trial motions, resulting in dismissal 
of claims for failing to meet timeliness, jurisdictional or pleadings requirements, or on issue or 
claim preclusion grounds. Accordingly, there is little if any discussion of the merits of the under­
lying claims. 
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Indeed, courts describe a typical fact pattern in such a way as to 
make the outcome clear that employers need not endure the following 
types of employees. 
In Brieland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., the district court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judgment on claims brought by 
an employee diagnosed with major depression and schizoid personal­
ity disorder. 170 The employee had repeated altercations with co-work­
ers in which he "blew up" at or "flipped ... off" other employees.171 
On one occasion he called a co-worker an "asshole," and there was 
evidence of other outbursts in violating the defendant'-s policy against 
"offensive behavior and violence" in the workplace. 172 The employer 
eventually suspended the plaintiff due to his alleged violation of the 
policy and after an incident of "uncontrolled anger."173 The court con­
cluded that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA and specifically rejected his assertion that he was disabled in his 
ability to have "normal social interactions with others."174 Similarly, 
the court rejected plaintiff's claims that the defendant regarded him as 
disabled or that, if he were disabled, that it failed to provide him rea­
sonable accommodations.175 It noted that the ADA does not require. 
the defendant to ignore plaintiff's misconduct.176 
In Schmidt v. Delta Airlines, the district court granted the 
employer's motion for summary judgment on claims brought by a 
sales reservation agent who was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive 
personality disorder~ explosive personality, anxiety, depression, and 
adjustment disorderP7 In response to his supervisors' repeated com­
plaints regarding lateness, poor productivity, and "manipulating" his 
telephone to block incoming calls, the plaintiff created a scene at the 
office in front of several supervisors and co-workers that included 
"ranting . . . yelling, waving his arms, and demqnding witnesses.'7178 
He was terminated shortly thereafter. 179 The district court easily con­
170 Brieland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 858 (D. Minn. 1997). 
171 ld. at 860-61. 
172 ld. 
173 !d. at 861. 
174 Id. at 863. 
175 ld. at 864. 
176 Brieland, 976 F. Supp. at 865. 
177 Schmidt v. Delta Airlines, No. 3:99-CV-0772-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7693 (N.D. Tex. 
June 8, 2001). 
178 ld. at *8. 
179 ld. at *2 n.l. 
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eluded that Delta demonstrated that the plaintiff was not a "qualified 
individual with a disability"180 since he could not perform the essential 
functions of his job and his proposed "accommodations" were unrea­
sonable.181 Moreover, the court found no evidence that Delta fired 
plaintiff because of his disability, although it may have terminated him 
due to misconduct resulting from his disabilities.182 
In Vosatka v. Columbia University, the district court granted the 
university summary judgment in a case where the university did not 
reappoint a tenure-track faculty member who made several sexual 
comments, offensive jokes, and false and "bizarre allegations" that a 
senior colleague assaulted another faculty member and stole mor­
phine to inject into a neighbor.183 The university ordered him to sub­
mit to a psychological examination due to such "erratic behavior."184 
The examining psychologist concluded that plaintiff was "not 
impaired by any major mental illness, and he is cognitively and emo­
tionally able to return to work," but that he had "maladaptive person­
ality traits" that were likely to significantly cramp his social 
"
185functioning. Since the report did not characterize the plaintiff as 
"mentally impaired," the court. concluded that no reasonable jury 
could find that the university regarded plaintiff as disabled based 
upon such an evaluation.186 
In Madonia v. Mavo Leasing, Inc., a company supervisor testified 
concerning the abrasive character of the employee.187 On one occa­
sion, the plaintiff approached the supervisor and, without provocation 
stated, "You know, you fucking assholes. You just want to fuck with 
me. Why do you fuck with me all the time?" 188 On another occasion, 
180 The defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff was disabled. !d. at *14. 
181 Id. at *16-*20. 
182 Id. at *23. 
183 Vosatka v. Columbia Univ., No. 04 Civ. 2936(LAP), 2005 WL 2044857 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 25, 2005). 
184 !d. at *3. 
185 !d. at *3, *7. 
186 /d. at *7. The court noted a number of other decisions in which an employer's require­
ment that an employee obtain a medical evaluation is not sufficient to demonstrate that the 
employer regarded the employee as disabled. ld. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Fallsburgh 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 Fed. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2003); Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 
804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999); Cody v. CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 
1998). . 
187 Madonia v. Mavo Leasing, Inc., No. 98 C 601, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5488 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 12, 2000). 
t8B /d. at *9. 
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the plaintiff became extremely angry with a co-worker and then began 
calling several managers "assholes" and "sons of bitches."189 On 
another occasion, the plaintiff confronted a co-worker who had inter­
rupted the plaintiff during a. phone call and threatened the co-worker 
if he ever "fucked with me or fucked with the telephone while I was 
using it, I would pound his fucking face into the concrete. "190 The 
plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression and an otherwise 
unspecified personality disorder.191 The· district court found there was 
a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was perceived to be 
disabled and whether he was "otherwise qualified." 192 It nonetheless 
granted summary judgment to the defendant-employer since the 
plaintiff failed to remain in treatment for his medical conditions as 
promised, a condition for continuing his employment after these 
outbursts.193 
In Lassiter v. Reno, the district court dismissed a claim by a dis­
charged federal marshal diagnosed with paranoid delusional personal­
ity disorder.194 The court concluded that the defendant had 
demonstrated that having a diagnosis of any "mental instability or his­
tory of a basic personality disorder" disqualifies the plaintiff from the 
position pursuant to United States Marshal Service "medical qualifi­
cations" regarding who may carry firearms. 195 Since the plaintiff was 
precluded from carrying a firearm, he could not perform the essential 
functions of a marshal nor be reasonable accommodated since there 
were no available administrative positions.196 
In Mazzarella v. U.S.P.S.,197 a decision applying the Rehabilita­
tion Act,198 the court used the same approach adopted in the above 
ADA cases. The district court entered summary judgment for the 
defendant on disability discrimination claims brought by a former 
189 !d. at *9. 
190 !d. at *3-*4. 
191 !d. at *6. 
192 !d. at *29-*32. 
193 Madonia, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5488 at *43. 
194 Lassiter v. Reno, 885 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996). 
195 Lassiter, 885 F. Supp. at 874. 
196 !d. at 874-75. 
197 849 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994) 
198 The ADA does not apply to the executive branch of the federal government itself, so 
federal employees must bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). 
While there are distinctions between the two laws, they are not implicated for purposes of the 
scope of this Article. 
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employee (referred to as a "disabled veteran") with "Explosive Per­
sonality Disorder."199 The employee became overwhelmed with his 
work assignments and, when he went to his supervisor's office to 
obtain a slip to go to the medical office, he began "screaming obscen­
ities" and "tear[ing] apart the office."200 The court concluded that this 
outburst rendered the plaintiff unable to perform the essential func­
tions of his job, and there was no reasonable accommodation that 
would enable him to do so.201 
Thus, contrary to the terror-invoking predictions of commenta­
tors who urged the elimination of persons with personality disorders 
from the ADA's scope to protect American workplaces, the statute 
has not compelled employers to tolerate chaotic, turbulent work­
places.202 Courts have essentially removed the potential sources of 
chaos and turbulence from the ADA's protection on a case-by-case 
basis.203 
l99 Mazzarella, 849 F. Supp. at 92. 

200 /d. at 93-94. 

201 /d. at 95. In another Rehabilitation Act case, Adams v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531 

(D.D.C. 1989), the district court granted summary judgment to the employer. The summary 
judgment record apparently was unclear regarding the plaintiff's type of mental illness. ld. at 
1531. The complaint alleged "adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotion and con­
duct," and a "compulsive personality disorder." ld. The medical evidence indicated that the 
plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks shortly after the incident that led to his firing-"violent 
physical assault upon a female supervisor ... followed by a rampage through the office damaging 
or destroying office equipment." ld. However, the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist did not 
describe his condition in DSM diagnosis terms, but stated that the plaintiff had a "maladaptive 
reaction to a psychosocial stressor" (referring to the "antagonizing supervisor" he assaulted). Id. 
The court concluded that this reaction was "hardly an 'impairment"' within the meaning of the 
ADA's requirements. /d. Even if he had an impairment, the court reasoned, "one who is unable 
to refrain from doing physical violence to the person of a supervisor, no matter how unfair he 
believes the supervision to be, or how provocative its manner, is simply not otherwise qualified 
for employment." /d. at 1532. 
202 Indeed, in at least one case, a plaintiff's reliance upon a personality disorder diagnosis 
rendered his claim more vulnerable to dismissal. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
rejected a plaintiff's disability discrimination claims under the state nondiscrimination statute 
based upon the diagnosis's nature. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Friedman, 507 A.2d 882, 885-86 (Pa. 
Ct. App. 1984). The plaintiff's own treating psychiatrist testified that the plaintiff had a person­
ality disorder and noted, on cross-examination by the employer's counsel, "I'm not sure any of 
us are spared that diagnosis." !d. Based on that concession, the court concluded that plaintiff 
did not have a disability and reversed the lower court's ruling in favor of the employee. Jd. at 
886. The dissent noted that the plaintiff had been in psychiatric treatment for many years and 
that he had substantial limitations in his life activities since his condition caused him to be chron­
ically late. /d. at 888-89. 
203 DiBenedetto v. City of Reading is one of the few cases in which a plaintiffs claims 
survived a defendant's pretrial motion. No. 96-CV-5055, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804 (E.D. Pa. 
Jul. 16, 1998). Nonetheless, it exemplifies the challenge presented by the nebulous quality of 
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4. 	 D~fendants' Successful Strategies for Eliminating "Personality" 
from the ADA's Reach 
Clearly, the case law reveals that persons with actual or perceived 
personality disorders struggle to have their ADA claims vindicated in 
court. How has this occurred? While most of these plaintiffs failed to 
establish that they were "qualified individuals with a disability," 
courts have not adopted a single approach to arrive at this conclusion. 
Depending upon the record evidence and the presentation of the dis­
puted legal issues, courts have halted discrimination claims based on 
"personality" issues using a number of different means. 
a. 	 Excluding Social interaction as a "Major Life Activity" Under 
the ADA 
The first step towards meeting the ADA's definition of disability 
is establishing that one has a physical or mental impairment.204 Courts 
rarely reject claims based upon this requirement since they generally 
assume for analysis purposes that the plaintiff's given condition suf­
fices as an "impairment" under the ADA. 
The requirement that plaintiff's impairment "substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such individual"205 presents 
the first true test for the plaintiff's claim. As seen in Brieland, the 
most significant limitations for persons with personality disorders 
arise in the area of social functioning. Most courts simply reject 
"interacting with others" and similar concepts as being an appropriate 
"major life activity" under the ADA's definition of disability. This 
approach runs contrary to that urged by the EEOC. In its Enforce­
ment Guidance, the EEOC asserted that an individual's "ability to 
interact with others" may be a major life activity for purposes of 
diagnoses assigned to individuals with personality disorders. The district court found that there 
was an issue of fact regarding whether the plaintiff was "disabled" due to the conflicting medical 
. evidence about his condition. ld. at *41. He was initially diagnosed with major anxiety syn­
drome, and after having aviolent altercation with a female suspect and a verbal altercation with 
a supervisor in which he shouted obscenities and vulgarities, an evaluating psychologist con­
cluded that the plaintiff had "a large amount of personality turmoil" and a "schizoid personal­
ity." /d. at *4-*8. A psychiatrist then diagnosed him with Attention Deficient Disorder al).d an 
"Axis II Personality Disorder, with obsessive paranoid and impulsive type features." Id. at *11. 
These findings were partially contradicted by a treating psychiatrist, who found that the plaintiff . 
only suffered from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. ld. at *15-*17. 
204 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
205 ld. 
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determining the presence of a substantial limitation.206 The agency 
reasoned: 
An impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to interact 
with others if, due to the impairment, s/he is significantly restricted as 
compared to the average person in the general population. Some 
unfriendliness with coworkers or a supervisor would not, standing 
alone, be sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in interacting 
with others. An individual would be substantially limited, however, if 
his/her relations with others were characterized on a regular basis by 
severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, 
social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary. 
These limitations must be long-term or potentially long-term, as 
opposed to temporary, to justify a finding of ADA .disability.Z07 
Such an approach suggests that persons experiencing difficulties 
with social functioning that rise to the level of a personality disorder 
diagnosis could demonstrate a substantial limitation in this major life 
activity under the ADA. However, the Enforcement Guidance has 
provided little support for such claims. While a few courts have fol­
lowed the EEOC's position, most notably the Ninth Circuit,208 a sig­
nificant number have refused to consider "interacting with others" to 
be a major life activity in itself.209 The Brieland court, for example, 
acknowledged that the EEOC listed "interacting with others" as a 
major life activity in its Compliance Manual,210 but noted that the 
manual was "not binding."211 As several commentators have 
observed, this trend presents a significant barrier to the claims of per­
sons with mental illness who can eat, walk, talk, and breathe without 
206 Enforcement Guidance, supra note 106, Question 9. 
207 ld. 
208 Head v. Glacier Northwest, 413 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that interacting 
with others is a major life activity); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that interacting with others is a major life activity because it "is an essential, 
regular function, like walking and breathing"). 
209 See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (confessing "some 
doubt" as to whether the ability to get along with others is a ·major life activity); Soileau v. 
Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (calling the ability to.get along with others a 
"remarkably elastic" notion, making it "unworkable as a definition" and distinguishing the 
notion from breathing or walking). 
210 Brieland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997) (quoting 
EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.3). 
211 !d. 
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difficulty but for whom normal social functioning is all but 
impossible.212 
In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., the Second Circuit's examination of 
whether and when "interacting with others" can be a major life activ­
ity, demonstrates how notions of personality and illness are inextrica­
bly bound together in the resolution of the question.213 Purportedly 
declining to follow either of the two lines of cases, the Second Circuit 
concluded that "interacting with others" could be a major life activity, 
but it rejected the Ninth Circuit's EEOC Enforcement Guidance­
based approach to the substantiality requirement.214 
In expounding the substantiality requirement, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that to recognize the "interacting with others" notion as a 
major life activity would not allow "any cantankerous person" to 
prove at law that he or she was "substantially limited" in a major life 
activity.215 Rather, the test for substantiality requires the factfinder to 
determine whether the impairment is regularly characterized by 
"'consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to 
communicate when necessary.' "216 
The Jacques court rejected this approach as "unworkable, 
unbounded, and useless as guidance to employers, employees, judges, 
and juries. "217 The court regarded the Ninth Circuit's demarcation 
between hostile and cantankerous persons as having no· basis in real­
ity.218 The Second Circuit opted for a much narrower application of 
"interacting with others"; a plaintiff demonstrates a substantial limita­
tion if he or she has a "mental or physical impairment (which] severely · 
limits the fundamental ability to communicate with others. "219 A 
plaintiff must show actual social "isolation" based upon a "severe con­
212 See Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting With Others: A Major Life Activity Under The Ameri­
cans With Disabilities Act?, 2002 W1s. L. REv. 1139; Bryan P. Stephenson, Comment: I'm So 
Lonesome I Could Cry ... But Could I Sue?: Whether "Interacting With Others" Is a Major Life 
Activity Under the ADA, 31 PEPP. I,... REv. 773 (2004); Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and 
Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REv. 997 (2004); Mark DeLoach, Note, Can't We All Just Get 
Along?: The Treatment of "Interacting with Others" as a Major Life Activity in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1313 (2004). 
213 Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2004). 
214 /d. at 201-03. 
215 McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). 
216 Jacques, 386 F.3d at 203 (quoting McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235). 
217 Jacques, 386 F.3d at 202. 
218 /d. 
219 /d. 
2006] THE PARADOX OF PERSONALITY 119 
dition.'mo The court explained that it sought an approach that would 
not "frustrate[] the maintenance of a civil workplace environment."221 
Echoing the concerns raised a decade earlier by employers and their 
attorneys, the court reasoned: "The more troublesome. and nasty the 
employee, the greater the risk of litigation costs for an employer that 
disciplines or fires him.222 All things being equal, a 'cantankerous' 
person or a curmudgeon would be more secure by becoming more 
unpleasant. "223 
While the plaintiff in Jacques had not been diagnosed with a per­
sonality disorder,224 the appeals court's description of her resembled 
that of the plaintiffs in the "personality disorder cases" described 
above: 
[The plaintiff is described] as a "problem employee": she was prone 
to "[ c ]onfrontations with co-workers, ... intolerance of [ethnic minor­
ities in the] production department, [and] (e]motional problems in 
dealing with supervisory staff''; she was the "most confrontational per­
son we have ever employed"; her supervisors and coworkers felt 
obliged to treat her with "kid gloves." The statement further 
explained that Mr. DiMarzio, in firing Jacques, "saw no reason why 
his supervisory staff should be forced to make such an extreme effort 
to tiptoe around and cater to someone who was emotionally 
unstable .•ms 
After a jury returned a verdict in favor of a person. with such a "per­
sonality," it is unsurprising that the appeals court fashioned a standard 
to prevent a similar result on retrial. The Jacques court admittedly 
220 Jd. One court applied this approach to a case brought by a man with Tourette's Syn­
drome who contended that he was substantially limited in his interactions with others because of 
their reactions to his tics. Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2005). In lan­
guage that could describe someone with a mental illness, the plaintiff offered evidence that "peo­
ple often regard him as 'strange,' and co-workers have often misinterpreted his words, gestures, 
and behaviors as rude, dismissive, aggressive, nasty, and controlling." Jd. at 89. Reasoning that 
the plaintiff had no difficulty communicating in "an objective mechanical sense," and therefore 
his impaired social functioning is "not encompassed by the basic definition of interacting with 
others" set forth by the DiMarzio court, the court granted the defendant summary judgment on 
this issue. /d. at 89, 100. 






224 Jd. at 195-96. The plaintiff claimed her primary disabling condition to be bipolar 
disorder. 
22s /d. at 197. 
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based its new standard on the judges'. perception of workplace har­
mony, as opposed to any reasoned understanding of disability or 
mental illness.226 
b. 	 Including Social Interaction as an "Essential Function" of the 
Job 
Even when a plaintiff with personality disorders succeeds in dem­
onstrating a substantial limitation in a major life activity, it is unlikely 
that she will establish that she is a qualified individual with a disabil­
ity. A "qualified" individual is one who, despite her disability, can still 
perform the essential functions of her job. A person who cannot per­
form all of the essential functions of his or her job is not a "qualified 
individual with a disability," and is therefore excluded from the 
ADA's protections.227 Similarly, employers cannot be compelled 
under the ADA to eliminate an essential function of a position to 
accommodate to a disabled employee; such "accommodation" is con­
sidered "unreasonable" per se.228 
The ADA gives employers broad discretion to define essential 
functions.229 Schmidt, Lassiter, and Mazzarella reveal that character­
izing the job's "essential functions" to eliminate persons with mental 
illness arid/or personality disorders legitimizes an employer's defense 
that it was maintaining workplace harmony.230 When courts permit 
businesses to include "getting along with co-workers" as an essential 
job function, anyone with an impaired or limited ability to do so, 
226 Jd. at 203. 
227 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8) (2000). 
228 Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, 147 F,3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998). 
229 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given 
to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has 
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this 
description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job."). See also 29 
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkenburg, 527 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1999). 
230 See, e.g., Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc. 70 F.3d 667, 670-71 (1st Cir. 1995). The 
court reviews case law to demonstrate that "essential requirements of a job" involve, in addition 
to technical skills and experience, mental and emotional stability, the ability to get along with 
others, the ability to follow instructions, and the ability to handle pressures of the job and learn 
specialized tasks. Jd. at 674-75~ See also Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 
1997) ("The ability to get along with co-workers and customers is necessary for all but the most 
solitary of occupations."); Misek-Falkoff v. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
("It is certainly a 'job-related requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get 
along with co-workers and supervisors."). 
121 2006] THE PARADOX OF PERSONALITY 
regardless ofthe reason or etiology,231 becomes categorically "unqual­
ified" for the job. Ironically, most courts have declined to find "inter­
acting with others" to be a major life activity for the purposes of 
meeting the definition of disability.232 This quandary is a primary rea­
son why persons with mental illness are seen as being all but written 
out of the ADA entirely.233 
c. Limiting the Scope of the "Regarded As". Disabled Prong 
At first blush, one might conclude that using the third prong of 
the ADA's definition of disability, which extends the statute's protec­
tion to persons "regarded as" disabled, would be the most useful 
approach for persons with personality disorders. Society's patho­
logization of disfavored personalities, as evidenced by the ever­
expanding list of DSM Axis II diagnoses, suggests that society regards 
those with personality disorders as disabled. However, plaintiffs with 
personality disorders who primarily rely on a "regarded as" approach, 
such as the plaintiffs in Pouncy and Vosatka, fare no better than plain­
tiffs who claim to be actually disabled. · 
Courts' construction of the "regarded as" prong has created 
nearly insurmountable barriers for plaintiffs cl~iming injury under this 
theory, regardless of the particular kind of "perceived disability."234 
To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her employer 
regarded her as "disabled" as the ADA defines the term. Specifically, 
this means that to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide 
record evidence that his or her employer actually .thought that the 
231 The defendant in Lassiter v. Reno, discussed supra at notes 194-96 and accompanying 
text, had a broad and blatant requirement: it was an essential function of the job to be free from 
any mental impairment or personality disorder. 885 F. Supp. at 875. · 
232 See supra Part II.B.4. 
233 Hensel notes: 
Plaintiffs are thus placed in an unenviable Catch-22: if they are disabled, they are not 
qualified, ·and if they are qualified, they are not disabled. It is ironic that courts continue 
to conclude that interacting with others is not a major life activity, while at the same time 
finding it is an essential function of virtually every job. Because the ADA was promul­
gated with the express purpose of enabling people with disabilities to become productive 
members of society and secure and maintain employment, this result is both untenable 
and intellectually unsound. · 
Hensel, supra note 212, at 1188-89. 
234 Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to 
Congressional intent, 42 VJLL. L. REv. 587 (1997) (criticizing the restrictive interpretation of the 
"regarded as" prong of the ADA prevalent among federal courts). 
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plaintiff was substantially limited in a major life activity.235 To the 
extent that a plaintiff claims tha~ he or she is limited in the major life 
activity of "working," the plaintiff must prove that his or her employer 
regarded him or her as disabled in a "broad range of jobs," not only 
the specific job in question.236 As a practical matter, such evidence is 
nearly impossible to obtain. An employer may openly assert that he 
wants a workplace free of "crazies" and may fire anyone with a psy­
chiatric diagnosis, but unless the plaintiff provides evidence that the 
employer subjectively believed that the plaintiff was substantially lim­
ited in a particular major life activity (in most jurisdictions it must be 
an activity other than interacting with others), the plaintiff will not 
prevail on the discrimination claim under. the "regarded as" 
approach.237 
The "regarded as" prong's limited reach may be seen in personal­
ity disorder cases as well. In Lynch v. Lee, the district court denied 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment after concluding that there 
were issues of fact regarding whether the plaintiff, who was diagnosed 
with "personality disorder and paranoia," was actually or regarded as 
disabled.238 The court noted that the record could also support a find­
ing that the plaintiff "simply was seen as an employee who was bring­
ing too many personal problems into the office and as a result was a 
detriment to the workings" of the office.239 In Duncan v. Wisconsin 
Department of Health,Z40 a counselor with "anger control" problems 
challenged his termination claiming that he was "regarded as" having 
a per~onality disorder.241 The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his 
employer regarded him as disabled from a broad range of positions.242 
235 See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153-54 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
236 See, e.g., Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1998). 
237 See Jamie C. Ray & Stephen S. Pennington, The Substantial Limitation Approach to 
Defining Disability: Why Does it Create an Insurmountable_ Barrier to Individuals Who are 
Regarded as Disabled?, 9 TEMP. PoL.'& C1v. RTS. L. REV. 333 (2000). 
238 Lynch v. Lee, No. 00-1435 § K4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16906 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2004). 
239 Jd. at *11. · 
240 166 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1999). 
241 !d. at 933, 935. 
242 In an unusual case from the Northern District of Ohio, Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 
1:03 CV 430, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28073 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2004), affd, 134 Fed. App'x 887 
(6th Cir. 2005), a plaintiff brought a disability discrimination claim arising from his employer's 
alleged perception of him as mentally ill. The plaintiff had ongoing and serious problems work­
ing with others and evaluations conducted for the employer yielded diagnoses that included 
• I 
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5. The Courts' Creation of Safe Harbors for Employers 
Cases brought by individuals with personality disorder diagnoses 
exemplify what Emens refers to as the "hedonic costs" implicated in 
discrimination against people with mental illness.243 At first blush, an 
employer's desire to avoid the "hedonic costs" associated with having 
a person with a mental illness in the workplace appears to be a classic 
case of discriminatory animus (i.e., wanting to avoid certain kinds of 
people). However, Emens argues that the "emotional contagion" 
from mental illness differs from "classic animus" in that typically there 
is no "hostility towards people with mental illness, at the categorical 
level or the individual level. "244 Because avoiding such costs is seen as 
a "reasonable act of self-preservation," the courts view this type of 
employment discrimination as "rational," which accounts for the 
results that almost entirely favor the employer-defendants.245 
Further, the typical solutions proposed for employment discrimi­
nation (i.e., integration-based approaches to lessen the "stigma" asso­
ciated with certain conditions by increasing others' contact with 
individuals possessing such conditions), may do little to stem the 
occurrence of such actions (and the resulting "emotional contagion" 
may have the opposite result), rendering discrimination against per­
sons with mental illness especially difficult to eradicate.246 One of the 
"severe personality disorder with paranoid elements and narcissistic elements." ld. at *1. The 
plaintiff contended that he was not disabled but that Ford incorrectly regarded him as such. /d. 
at *3. The trial court entered summary judgment for the employer since there appeared to be no 
"mistake" in Ford's conclusion that the plaintiff had a mental illness, and, in any event, the 
plaintiff had not demonstrated that Ford took any adverse employment action against him. /d. 
at *4-*5. 
243 Emens, supra note 48, at 401. 
244 /d. at 443. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) ("Discrimination 
against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not ol' invidi­
ous animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect."). 
245 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REv. 923 (2004) (explaining that one reason court 
decisions have restricted, rather than expanded, the ADA's reach as compared with other civil 
rights laws is that the Supreme Court regards employers' actions toward disabled employees as 
"rational" conduct, rather than "intentional" discrimination). Of course, a related explanation 
for the overwhelming results in favor of employers is that the stigma of mental illness is so 
pervasive in our society that even federal judges are not immune, and they accordingly refuse to 
extend nondiscrimination protection to people with mental illness in employment cases. 
246 Emens, supra note 48, at 445. See also Teresa L. Schied, ADA and Employment of 
Those With Mental Disabilities, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DJSA· 
BILITIES Acr: IssuEs IN LAw, PUBLIC PoLICY, AND RESEARCH 152-53 (Peter David Blanck ed., 
2000). 
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underlying assumptions of employment discrimination laws is that dis­
crimination results in part due to incorrect and ignorance-based 
assumptions and prejudices of the capabilities of members of certain 
minority groups (such as women, African-Americans, or older work­
ers). Thus, compelled integration of the protected minority in the 
workplace presumably leads to greater understanding and apprecia­
tion of the true abilities of such individuals. However, if the nature of 
a person's minority status is that she is disabled in social functioning, 
as is the case for many persons with mental illness, it may be less likely 
that her co-workers and employers will gain such understanding and 
appreciation through increased contact with her.247 
Therefore, regardless of the central question a particular case 
poses (whether it is the definition of disability or the essential func­
tions of the job), courts have created a comfortable safe harbor for 
employers who address the "hedonic costs" of having employees with 
personality disorders through termination and other adverse employ­
ment actions against these employees. In very few cases do employ­
ees with actual or perceived personality disorders survive the early 
stages of an ADA claim. 
While the fact patterns and legal analyses of cases involving 
workers with actual or perceived personality disorders may make 
basic sense in terms of the outcomes, they mask the more complicated 
issue of how we regard disfavored personalities and mental illness 
under the law. Courts appear confident that they have not condoned 
discrimination based on mental illness by finding in favor of employ­
ers in the relevant ADA cases because the cases implicate only "per­
sonality issues" and not true . disabilities. Courts have used the 
dichotomy to both reject "interacting with others" as a major life 
activity and to permit employers to define a job's essential functions 
to exclude people with impaired social functioning. Further, the 
"regarded as" prong's constricted view of the definition practically 
dooms the claims brought by those with apparently impaired person­
alities. By halting such claims at the claim's definitional stage-where 
the plaintiff is essentially "classified" for statutory purposes-courts 
247 Emens, supra note 48, at 445-46 (discussing the limited reach of the "contact hypothe· 
sis," which assumes that "increasing contact between members of stigmatized groups and outsid· 
ers will decrease the stigma attributed to those groups by the outsiders," for decreasing 
discrimination against people with mental illness in the workplace). 
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evade the more complex issue of how society must, if at all, accommo­
date those whose personalities it has labeled as disordered.248 
III. PERSONALITY ScREENING UNDER THE ADA 
As the fact patterns of some of the cases discussed above suggest, 
employers will likely embrace a mechanism that enables them to 
screen out troublesome prospective employees at the hiring stage. 
Thus, courts have also attempted to distinguish between personality 
traits and mental illness under the ADA when analyzing claims chal­
lenging the administration of so-called "personality tests" in the work­
place. The central issue implicated in these cases is a determination of 
whether the employer is using a test to reveal mental illness, which the 
ADA expressly prohibits, or merely to uncover undesirable personal­
ity traits in an applicant or employee. Unsurprisingly, courts have 
been unable to reach a consensus on the proper judicial test to deter­
mine the employer's motives in administering the test in any given 
case. 
A. The Development of Personality '[esting 
The history of psychological testing and personality screening 
closely tracks that of mental illness diagnosis and classification dis­
cussed above. Personality testing originated in hospital settings to 
classify patients.249 In the early- to mid-twentieth century, doctors 
were followed by the '~corporate and government bureaucrats, with 
their need to sort and manage large groups of people."250 Several dif­
ferent tests were developed with the aim of approximating an "X-ray 
of the personality."251 However, in some respects, these tests reveal 
more about the developers' and users' own perceptions and goals. 252 
As writer Annie· Paul notes in her recent critique of personality 
testing: "Today, personality tests are a startlingly ubiquitous part of 
American life, from the thousands of quizzes popping up on-line, to 
the personality types assigned in seminars and workshops, to the hon­
248 See Feldblum, supra note 107, at 164 (arguing that courts should employ a broad over· 
inclusive view of "disability," and "expend their energy remedying real cases of discrimination 
and dismissing non-meritorious cases on the basis of their lack of merit"). 
249 PAUL, supra note 6, at 47-48. ! 

250 Jd. at 206. 

251 Jd. at 221. 

252 ld. at 226 (citing Joseph Masling in THE SIXTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 

495 (Oscar Buros ed., 1965)). 
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esty tests and personality screens routinely required of job appli­
cants."253 A 2003 survey of 1,149 American businesses revealed that 
30% of employers administer personality tests to current and prospec­
tive employees.254 The chief executive officer of a corporate testing 
company rationalized the widespread use of such devices as follows: 
In light of the struggling economy, the makeup of a manager's person­
ality is more important than ever, especially his or her ability to han­
dle the stress of meeting profit targets. . . . Companies are pushing 
hard right now to turn the economic corner. An executive candidate 
who seems qualified in every way except for a red flag on a personality 
test may be viewed by a prospective employer as not the right fit for 
corporate culture shaped around instant productivity.255 
Eighty-nine of the Fortune 100 companies administer the Myers­
Briggs Type Indicator to their employees to categorize each employee 
as one of sixteen personality "types."256 While this type of testing in 
the workplace is not a new phenomenon and many employers view 
the development and use ofthese tests as a valuable approach to man­
aging "human resources," other see personality testing as employer 
overreaching.257 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), one 
of the most widely-used personality screening tests, appears to have 
spawned the most litigation. 258 In 1942, a psychologist and psychiatrist 
at University of Minnesota developed it to classify patients in the Uni­
253 PAUL, supra note 6, at xi. For example, several websites offer free tests designed to 
identify, not whether you have a personality disorder, but which one specifically best fits your 
personality. See, e.g., http://www.blogthings.com/personalitydisorderquiz/; http://quizilla.com/ 
users/rosiekins/ quizzes/Which% 20Personality%20Disorder% 20Do %20You %20Ha ve% 3F/; 
http://selectsmart.com/FREE/select.php?client=disorders; http:i/similarminds.com/personality_ 
disorder.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
254 Business Editors, Drug Testing a Prominent Part of the Hiring Process; Most Employers 
Now Ask Job Candidates to Consent ro Testing, According to National Survey by Leading 
Recruiter, Business Wire, Apr. 30, 2003. 
255 Jd. (quoting Allen Salikof, President and CEO of Management Recruiters 
International). 
256 PAUL, supra note 6, at xiii (citing CPP Celebrates 60th Anniversary of Myers-Briggs 
Assessment, PR Newswire, Oct. 28, 2003). 
257 PAUL, supra note 6, at 117 ("Is the individual's innermost self any business of the organ­
ization's? In return for the salary that the Organization gives the individual, it can ask for super­
lative work from him, but it should not ask for his.psyche as well.") (quoting William Whyte, The 
Organization Man 201 (1956)). 
258 See infra notes 288-350 and accompanying text. 
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versity's inpatient mental health hospitai.259 To determine "normal" 
behavior, the test designers surveyed an all-white, mostly-Protestant 
group of 724 Minnesotans, which served as "psychology's major 
benchmark of normality for the next fifty years. "260 Acknowledging 
that its original form was geared towards attitudes that have time and 
place limits, developers of the MMPI updated the test by releasing the 
MMPI-2 in 1989.261 However, the majority of questions remain 
unchanged.262 Today, it is used in many employment settings includ­
ing 60% of police departments nationwide.263 
The form of MMPI or MMPI-2 discussed in the ADA cases264 is 
an examination written for a sixth-grade reading level, which consists 
of several hundred true-false questions including several addressing 
the test-takers' religious beliefs,265 sexua).ity,266 and political atti­
259 PAUL, supra note 6, at 47-48. 
260 ld. at 51-52. 
261 !d. at 69-70. 
262 MILLON, MASTERS OF THE MIND, supra note 40, at 573. The revised version used a 
"sample more representative of the U.S. population ... tore-norm the MMPI-2." /d. 
263 PAUL, supra note 6, at 63. One psychologist-commentator has observed: "The MMPI-2 
is based on extensive peer-reviewed and published research and compares a test subject's indi­
vidual scores with data from both normative samples and several clinical samples. Multiple stud­
ies over long periods of time has established reasonable and acceptable levels of validity and 
reliability for the MMPI-2, and it remains a robust and widely used assessment tool in both 
clinical and forensic settings." David Mendoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: 
Considerations Following Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. Cr. REv. 199, 208 (2003). 
264 Additional revisions have been made to the MMPI-2, hi.rgely in the "scales" used to 
map the results. The nine "Restructured Clinical Scales" include: Demoralization; Somatic 
Complaints; Low Positive Emotions; Cynicism; Antisocial Behavior; Ideas of Persecution; Dys­
functional Negative Emotions; Aberrant Experiences; Hypomanic Activation. See Description 
by the Publisher of the MMPI-2, Pearson Assessments, available at http://www.pearsonassess 
ments.corn!tests/mmpi2rcscales.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2006). 
265 For example, one court noted the following questions on the MMPI-2: 
67. I feel sure that there is only one true religion .... 
201. I have no patience with people who believe there is only one true religion .... 
477. My soul sometimes leaves my body.... 
483. A minister can cure disease by praying and putting his hand on your head ... . 
486. Everything is turning out just like the prophets of the Bible said it would ... . 
505. I go to church almost every week. 
506. I believe in the second coming of Christ. . . . 
516. I believe in a life hereafter .... 
578. I am very religious (more than most people) .... 
580. I believe my sins are unpardonable .... 
606. I believe there is a God .... 
688. I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in afterlife. 
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
266 For example: 
137. I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex .... 
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tudes.267 The answers result in scores on ten clinical scales: 1) hypo­
chondriasis; 2) depression; 3) hysteria; 4) psychopathic deviate; 5) 
masculinity-femininity; 6)paranoia; 7) psychasthenia;268 8) schizophre­
nia; 9) hypomania; and 10) social introversion.269 Results are referred 
to by elevations on specific scales; thus, a "2-4" result refers to ele­
vated score on the 2d (depression) and 4th (psychopathic deviate) 
scales. 
As acknowledged above, another widely-administered personal­
ity test in workplaces is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. This test is 
based upon Carl Jung's theory of psychological "types," with eight 
specific categories of traits (introverted/extroverted, intuiting/sensing, 
thinking/feeling, and judging/perceiving).270 The answers to the forced 
choice questions result in a score in each trait pair and a classification 
as one of sixteen possible "types. "271 Other tests with less widespread 
use in the workplace include Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor 
Questionnaire, the PASS-III D.A.T.A. Survey, the Millon Clinical 
290. I have never been in trouble because of my sex behavior .... 
339. I have been in trouble one or more times because of my sex behavior .... 
466. My sex life is satisfactory.... 
492. I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex .... 
496. I have often wished I were a girl. (Or if you are a girl) I have never been sorry that I 
am a girl. ... 
525. I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices .... 

'558. I am worried about sex matters .... 

592. I like to talk about sex. . . . 
640. Many of my dreams are about sex matters. 
!d. 
267 Other general questions include: "I am very seldom troubled by constipation"; "I love 
my father"; "I have no difficulty in starting or holding my bowel movements"; "Several times a 
week I feel as if something dreadful is going to happen"; "I wake up fresh and rested most 
mornings"; "There is something wrong with my sex organs"; "I like to flirt"; "I have a good 
aP.petite"; "Women should not be allowed to drink in cocktail bars"; "If th.e money were right, I 
would like to work for a circus or carnival"; "I think Lincoln was greater than Washington"; 
"Illegal use of marijuana is worse than drinking liquor"; "I think I would like to belong to a 
motorcycle club"; and "Often I feel as if there were a tight band around my head." See PAuL, 
supra note 6, at 53, 65. 
268 Defined by THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DicnoNARY as "A psychological disorder char­
acterized by phobias, obsessions, compulsions, or excessive anxiety. No longer in scientific use." 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DicnONARY.oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2,000). 
269 See http://www.pearsonassessments.com/tests/mmpi_2.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
The test results also include several other scales, including validity scales. Richard Niolon, The 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (http:!/www.psychpage.com/objective/mmpi2_ 
overview.htm) (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
270 PAuL, supra note 6, at 106-12. 
271 PAuL, supra note 6, at 111. See also Malcolm Gladwell, Personality Plus, THE NEw 
YoRKER 42, 43 (Sept. 20, 2004). 
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Multiaxial Inventory, and the Thematic Apperception Test, and many 
other tests specifically designed to test traits such as honesty and 
integrity.272 
B. The ADA and Medical Examinations 
In addition to the general prohibition against disability-based dis­
crimination, the ADA imposes certain limitations on the use of "medi­
cal examinations and inquiries" in the employment setting.273 
Specifically, a prospective. employer may not "conduct· a medical 
examination or make inquiries" as to whether a job applicant has disa­
bility.274 However, a prospective employer may inquire into an appli­
cant's "ability to perform job-related functions." 275 
This limitation on "medical examinations," however, does not 
prohibit the use of a medical examination if it occurs after an offer of 
employment has already been extended, but before the person has 
started the job duties.276 An employer may condition the job offer on 
the examination's results if: 1) all applicants for the position are sub­
ject to the examination; 2) an applicant's medical condition and his­
tory information is maintained in a separate manner and location and 
is treated as "confidential" (with a few exceptions277); and 3) the 
results are used "only in accordance with" the ADA (meaning, in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion). 278 Title I of the ADA also limits examina­
tions and inquiries required of employees (that is, after hiring has 
taken place), except to the extent such examinations are "shown to be 
. job-related or consistent with business necessity."279 
What are the implications of such limitations on the widespread 
use of personality testing in the workplace? The answer is far from 
settled, precisely because the age?cies and courts applying the statute 
272 See generally PAUL, supra note 6, at 96-101,178. There are several competing personal­
ity inventory tests, designed specifically for administration in the workplace, such as the Personal 
Outlook Inventory, Personnel Reaction Bank, the POI Employment Inventory, the Reliability 
Scale of the Hogan Personality Inventory, and the California Personality Inventory. David J. 
Shaffer & Ronald A. Schmidt, Personality Testing in Employment, Dec. 1999, available at http:// 
library.findlaw.comll999/Dec/22/130153.html#intro (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
273 STEFAN, HoLLOW PROMISES, supra note 117, at 147. 
274 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2}(A) (2000). 
275 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2000). 
276 42 u.s.c. § 12112(d)(3} (2000). 
277 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2000). 
278 42 u.s.c. § 12112(d)(3) (2000). 
279 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000). 
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rely heavily on the elusive distinction between mental illness and per­
sonality. The EEOC's ADA regulations state that it is unlawful to use 
"employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend 
to screen out" those with disabilities on the basis of such disabilities, 
unless such test is job-related and consistent with business necessity.280 
In the interpretive guidance to such regulations, the EEOC specifi­
cally acknowledges that some industries select individuals because of 
"physical and psychological criteria," some of which may be identified 
through a post-offer, pre-employment examination.281 
In 1995, the EEOC, perhaps recognizing that the statute and its 
regulations leave many questions unanswered about the validity of 
testing in particular contexts, issued a specific Enforcement Guidance 
on Pre-Employment Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Exami­
nations ("Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement Guidance"). 282 Five 
years later, the agency released an enforcement guidance on post-hir­
ing testing, entitled Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related 
Inquires and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act, in which it notes: "There are a number of 
procedures and tests employers may require that generally are not 
considered medical examinations, including . . . psychological tests 
that measure personality traits such as honesty, preferences, and hab­
its. "283 Thus, the agency's own interpretation of the ADA's language 
directly implicates the illness-versus-personality dichotomy. 
Since a test that approximates a medical exam is acceptable, even 
though it seeks information about physical or mental condition, the 
Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement Guidance lists seven factors to 
consider when determining whether a test constitutes a prohibited 
"medical examination": 1) whether a health care professional 
administers the test; 2) whether a health care professional interprets 
280 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.10, 1630.13, 1630.14 (2000). 
281 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (comment) (2000). For example, candidates for jobs in law 
enforcement are regularly subjected to post-offer physical and psychological testing; job offers 
are often rescinded if the testing shows abnormalities. 
282 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment 
Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations, Oct. 10, 1995, available at http://www. 
eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html ("Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement Guidance"). 
283 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance: Disability­
Related Inquires and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, July 27, 2000, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.htrnl. This 
document specifically refers readers to the Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement Guidance for 
additional explanation of what tests constitute "medical examinations." Jd. 
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the test; 3) whether the test is designed to reveal a physical or mental 
health impairment; 4) whether the test is invasive; 5) whether the test 
measures an employee's performance of a task or his/her physiological 
responses to performing the task; 6) whether the test is normally given 
in a medical setting; and 7) whether medical equipment is used.284 The 
Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement Guidance does not specify 
whether one or more factors are dispositive in the determination. 
The example offered in the Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement 
Guidance demonstrates the tight line the EEOC expects employers 
and courts to walk when it comes to applying these factors to a pre­
employment psychological test: 
Example: ·A psychological test is designed to reveal mental illness, but 
a particular employer says it does not give the test to disclose mental 
illness (for example, the employer says it uses the test to disclose just 
tastes and habits). But, the test also is interpreted by a psychologist, 
and is routinely used in a clinical setting to provide evidence that 
would lead to a diagnosis of a mental disorder or impairment (for 
· example, whether an applicant has paranoid tendencies, or is 
depressed). Under tpese facts, this test is a medical examination.285 
In response to the commonly asked question, "May an employer 
give psychological examinations to applicants?" the EEOC provides 
the following answer: 
Yes, unless the particular examination is medical. This determination 
would be based on some of the factors listed above, such as the pur­
pose of the test and the intent of the employer in giving the test: Psy­
chological examinations are medical if ~hey provide evidence that 
would lead to identifying a mental disorder or impairment (for exam­
ple, those listed in the American Psychiatric Association's mos~ recent 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)). 
Example: An employer gives applicants the RUOK Test (hypotheti­
cal), an examination which reflects whether applicants have character­
istics that lead to identifying whether the individual has excessive 
anxiety, depression, and certain compulsive disorders (DSM-listed 
conditions). This test is medical. 
284 /d. 
285 /d. 
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On the other hand, if a test is designed and used to measure only 
things such as honesty, tastes, and habits, it is not medical. 
Example: An employer gives the IFIB Personality Test (hypotheti­
cal), an examination designed and used to reflect only whether an 
applicant is likely to lie. This test, as used by the employer, is not a 
medical examination.286 
Interestingly, this response is one of the few places where the 
ADA purportedly intersects with the DSM. The EEOC assumes a 
· broad definition of "mentalillness" since the DSM includes personal­
ity disorders among the mental disorders and impairments listed. The 
examples of traits that may be a valid basis for testing (and presuma­
bly employment decisions) are narrowly drawn as "honesty, tastes, 
and habits. "2~ Therefore, the Pre-Employment Testing Enforcement 
Guidance suggests that the range of permissible psychological testing 
is quite limited and any test that could lead to classifying someone in 
terms of a mental disorder violates the ADA. 
C. 	 Courts' Varied Approaches to Analyzing the Legality of 

Personality Tests Under the ADA 

In practice, the EEOC's attempts to guide the courts have failed 
to ensure unanimity among courts' analyses of the validity of person­
ality testing in the workplace. Courts have not taken a consistent 
approach when determining whether a personality test qualifies as an 
impermissible "medical examination." Although the courts have 
adopted a more generous view of the scope of permissible psychologi­
cal testing than the EEOC contemplated, they ultimately employ 
unsettled and inconsistent approaches.288 
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. illustrates the competing meth­




288 The ADA has not been the exclusive or primary vehicle for legal challenges. Plaintiffs 
have attempted other legal strategies to challenge the administration of personality tests in 
employment. In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., the court reversed denial of preliminary 
injunction against Target Corporation, which administered the MMPI to all security guard appli­
cants, on the basis that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on invasion of privacy claims under the 
California Constitution, Fair Employment and Housing Act, and Labor Code due to the MMPI's 
inquiries regarding the religious beliefs and sexual orientation of applicants. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
